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ILLEGAL EMIGRATION: THE CONTINUING




Federal appeals courts overturn more than one thousand deportation or-
ders every year. A significant number of those reversals involve non-citi-
zens who are abroad because they have been deported as a result of losing
their cases at the administrative level. Although an order overturning a
deportation order ordinarily restores non-citizens to their prior status of
being lawfully present in the United States, federal immigration authorities
have used the fact of the non-citizen's now-invalidated deportation to sub-
ject such non-citizens to a new and previously inapplicable set of standards
that effectively prevents them from returning. Under this practice, non-citi-
zens who seek to return after winning from abroad are treated as "arriving
aliens," meaning that because they are now outside the United States, the
government can keep them out, even if they never should have been re-
moved in the first place.
Neither courts nor scholars have addressed the lawfulness of applying
the law's more stringent "arriving alien" standards to non-citizens who pre-
vail from abroad rather than the more lenient "deportability" standards
that apply prior to the non-citizen's removal. This Article examines the
competing arguments for and against the government's practice and con-
cludes that relying on non-citizens' wrongful deportations to apply new
rules that keep non-citizens from returning deprives them of meaningful
judicial review of their deportation orders in violation of both federal im-
migration law and the U.S. Constitution. Instead, requiring the govern-
ment to apply the same "deportability" standards throughout a non-
citizen's removal proceedings will best ensure that erroneously deported
individuals are permitted to reenter the United States, reunite with their
families, and resume their lives as they existed prior to their removal.
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I. INTRODUCTION
UMEROUS immigrants-"aliens" in legal parlance'-who have
been deported by the government have succeeded in overturning
their deportation orders, but only after the government has re-
moved them from the United States.2 Although overturning deportation
orders ordinarily restores non-citizens to their prior status of being law-
fully present in the United States, federal immigration authorities have
used the fact of the non-citizen's (now invalidated) deportation to apply a
previously inapplicable set of standards in order to prevent such non-citi-
zens from returning. These entry standards, which typically are reserved
for non-citizens seeking permission to enter the United States for the first
time, are in many ways more stringent than deportation standards. Thus,
under the government's practice, wrongfully deported immigrants can be
kept out of the United States even if they never should have been re-
moved in the first place, simply because they happened to be outside the
United States, rather than inside, when they won their case.
The inability of wrongly deported immigrants to return is a significant
and growing concern. Federal courts are hearing record numbers of de-
1. The term "alien" is a legal term of art that encompasses "any person not a citizen
or national of the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2006).
2. For example, federal courts grant more than 1,000 petitions for review of deporta-
tion orders every year. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
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portation challenges and reverse deportation orders at substantially
higher rates than for other appeals. 3 Many of those reversals involve
non-citizens who have already been deported.4 For non-citizens, the
stakes could not be higher. Deportation, which is the equivalent of ban-
ishment from one's home, family, and community, is one of the most se-
vere punishments that the government can inflict upon non-citizens. 5
Moreover, the government's actions in subjecting wrongly deported
aliens to new standards even after courts overturn their deportation or-
ders cast light on a larger problem of treating wrongfully deported immi-
grants differently from immigrants who remain inside the United States.
The example of Ronaldo Quinones illustrates the consequences that non-
citizens suffer as a result of this differential treatment.
6
Mr. Quinones is a lawful permanent resident who has lived in the
United States since he emigrated from Honduras as a young child. Soon
after turning eighteen, he was found with marijuana rolling papers and
charged with a misdemeanor offense of possession of drug paraphernalia
near a school zone. 7 Upon advice of counsel, he pleaded guilty, received
a sentence of probation, and the case was closed.
For Mr. Quinones, however, the case was not closed. Soon after start-
ing probation, federal immigration authorities detained him and placed
him in deportation proceedings pursuant to the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act (INA).8 Even though Mr. Quinones never had any drugs on
him, the government charged him as being deportable as an immigrant
who has been convicted of an offense "relating to a controlled
substance." 9
Mr. Quinones appeared before an immigration judge and argued that
he was not deportable because his conviction falls within a statutory ex-
ception for crimes involving possession of thirty grams or less of mari-
juana. 10 The immigration judge rejected his argument and ordered Mr.
3. See infra Part II.B.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. The name "Ronaldo Quinones" is a pseudonym used to protect privacy. However,
the story described here is closely based on the real experiences of immigrants who have
succeeded in overturning their deportation orders from abroad.
7. In addition to outlawing the possession of drugs, many states also criminalize the
possession of drug paraphernalia, even if the accused possessed no drugs at all. See, e.g.,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:36-2 (West 2005).
8. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006). This section lays out framework for subjecting non-
citizens to removal proceedings.
9. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). The federal Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) makes
deportable any immigrant who has been convicted of a controlled substance offense. Id.
Numerous courts have held that possession of drug paraphernalia relates to a controlled
substance and therefore constitutes a removable offense. See, e.g., Barma v. Holder, 640
F.3d 749, 751 (7th Cir. 2011); Luu-Le v. INS, 224 F.3d 911, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2000).
10. The statute includes an exemption stating that an individual is not deportable if the
controlled substance conviction was for a "single offense involving possession for one's
own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana." 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).
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Quinones to be deported back to Honduras.'1 Mr. Quinones appealed to
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and by law received an auto-
matic stay of the deportation order for the pendency of the appeal.' 2 The
BIA also found that the thirty-gram exception did not apply and affirmed
the immigration judge's deportation order.
Mr. Quinones then filed a petition for review with the federal circuit
court of appeals.13 Unlike when a case is pending before the BIA, fed-
eral law does not provide for an automatic stay of deportation when a
case is pending in federal court.14 Mr. Quinones filed a request for a
discretionary stay, but the court denied it.' 5 Soon after, federal immigra-
tion authorities executed the immigration judge's deportation order and
removed Mr. Quinones to Honduras.
One year after Mr. Quinones was deported, the court of appeals over-
turned the immigration judge's removal order, finding that the thirty-
gram exception could be applied to Mr. Quinones's offense. The court
remanded to the immigration judge for a determination of whether, in
Mr. Quinones's specific case, his conviction involved thirty grams or less
of marijuana.
By then, Mr. Quinones was abroad, but was no longer subject to a de-
portation order, as the court's ruling vacated the order. He wanted to
return to the United States so that he could be reunited with his family,
all of whom live in the United States. Upon contacting the relevant fed-
eral authorities about reentering the country, he was told that he would
be denied entry if he tried to return. The reason, according to the gov-
ernment, was that because he was now outside the United States and
seeking to enter, as opposed to someone inside the United States whom
authorities were seeking to remove, the authorities would treat him as an
"arriving alien" subject to the statute's more restrictive admissibility pro-
visions rather than the deportability provisions under which he was origi-
nally charged.
In other words, even if Mr. Quinones's conviction did not necessarily
provide a basis for removing him from the United States in the first place,
once he was removed (even on grounds that were subsequently over-
turned), the statute provided a basis to prevent him from reentering the
11. An alien like Mr. Quinones would also be eligible for a form of relief from re-
moval called cancellation of removal. See id. § 1229b(a). However, cancellation of re-
moval is a discretionary remedy that the immigration judge is under no obligation to
provide. See, e.g., In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 10-12 (B.I.A. 1998). Moreover, for
individuals other than lawful permanent residents, the number of aliens who can receive
cancellation of removal is capped at 4,000, regardless of the number of aliens who may be
eligible. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(e).
12. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(a) (2006) (stating that, with certain exceptions, orders relat-
ing to immigrants shall not be carried out while an appeal with the Board of Immigration
Appeals is pending).
13. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2006) (allowing aliens to file petitions for review of final
deportation orders to the federal courts of appeals).
14. See infra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text for an explanation of the process for
seeking a stay of removal.
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country. Just as a controlled substance conviction makes a non-citizen
residing in the United States deportable, it also makes a non-citizen seek-
ing to enter the United States "inadmissible."1 6 However, while the de-
portability provisions provide an exception for convictions involving
thirty grams or less of marijuana, the inadmissibility provisions do not.17
For Mr. Quinones, this switch makes all the difference.
One might consider such behavior to be changing the rules in the mid-
dle of the game. In the realm of immigration law, however, it has been
common practice. Executive branch attorneys have repeatedly taken the
view that aliens who succeed in overturning their deportation orders after
their removal must now, as a result of their deportation, be treated as
"arriving aliens" subject to the Act's inadmissibility provisions.' 8 This
creates unfair results for individuals like Mr. Quinones who fall within
what others have termed the "inadmissibility gap." 19 The INA's inadmis-
sibility provisions, which apply to arriving aliens, are in many ways more
onerous than its deportability provisions, which apply to aliens who have
been living inside the country. As a result, certain aliens fall in the "gap"
where their conduct renders them inadmissible but not deportable.2
0
Consequently, under the government's practice, a non-citizen who was
wrongly deported may find himself barred from reentry because of the
very act of removal that was held to be wrongful. In other words, the
alien will remain deported simply because he was outside the country
when he won his case rather than inside the country.
Although the government has suggested publicly that aliens who pre-
vail from abroad should be restored to their prior immigration status,2' in
many cases the government has relegated them to a lesser status by tak-
ing aliens who were lawful permanent residents (LPRs) prior to deporta-
tion and reclassifying them as "arriving aliens" following their post-
deportation success in court. This Article examines the government's
practice and concludes that it is inconsistent with federal immigration law
and denies aliens their right to meaningful judicial review of deportation
orders. From the alien's perspective, the right to judicial review is of little
value if an alien can win his case only to find that the government can use
the fact of deportation to apply new rules that bar the alien from reenter-
ing the country.
As this Article was going to press, the federal government announced
16. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2006).
17. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006) with id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).
18. See infra Part II.
19. See Nancy Morawetz, The Invisible Border: Restrictions on Short-Term Travel by
Noncitizens, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 201, 207 (2007) (using the term "inadmissibility gap" to
describe situations where an individual is inadmissible but not deportable).
20. See infra Part II.B; see also Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 479 (2011) (explain-
ing that the inadmissibility and removability provisions of the INA are "sometimes over-
lapping and sometimes divergent").
21. See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
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new measures pertaining to aliens prevailing from abroad.22 The govern-
ment acknowledged that immigrants who prevail from abroad were not
always restored to their prior status, and expressed a commitment to help
facilitate the return of such aliens to the United States.23 The new mea-
sures deal in large part with the administrative aspects of ensuring that a
deported alien can return, such as issuing proper travel documents and
border crossing authorizations. 24 They also indicate that aliens who pre-
vail will be restored to the immigration status they had prior to
removal. 25
While the government's new measures may mitigate the "inadmissibil-
ity gap" problem to some degree, they do not ensure that the problem
will go away. The government did not make these changes because it felt
compelled to do so as a matter of law,26 but did so as a policy decision-
one that could be reversed just as quickly as it was adopted. It remains
important to address the legality of the government's practices in the
event that the policy changes or evolves. Additionally, the new measures
do not explicitly address the inadmissibility gap and do not expressly pro-
hibit charging a prevailing alien under inadmissibility standards rather
than deportability standards. In fact, in certain ways treating prevailing
aliens as subject to inadmissibility standards would appear to be perfectly
consistent with the government's new policies.27
The question of what rights and remedies are available to non-citizens
who succeed in overturning their deportation orders from abroad has
been little explored by scholars or the courts.28 In particular, no article
22. See Letter from Stuart Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Div., U.S.
Dep't of Justice (Apr. 25, 2012), available at http://www.ilw.com/immigrationdaily/news/
2012,0426-dreeben.pdf [hereinafter Delery Letter].
23. See id.; Letter from Michael R. Dreeben, Deputy Solicitor Gen. for William K.
Suter, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States, at 3-4 (Apr. 24, 2012), available at
http://www.ilw.com/immigrationdaily/news/2012,0426-dreeben.pdf [hereinafter Dreeben
Letter].
24. See Delery Letter, supra note 22.
25. See Dreeben Letter, supra note 23, app. B.
26. In fact, the government appears to believe that the law does not dictate one result
over another, as it stated that "[t]he issue was not addressed by statute." Dreeben Letter,
supra note 23, at 2.
27. See infra notes 41-43, 75-76, and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Will Padilla Reach Across the Border?, 45 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 327 (2011) [hereinafter Rosenbloom, Will Padilla Reach Across the Border?]
(addressing the ramifications of the Supreme Court's decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130
S. Ct. 1473 (2010), for aliens who have already been deported); Rachel E. Rosenbloom,
Remedies for the Wrongly Deported: Territoriality, Finality, and the Significance of Depar-
ture, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. 139 (2010) [hereinafter Rosenbloom, Remedies for the Wrongly
Deported] (arguing that the Board of Immigration Appeals' rule prohibiting it from consid-
ering motions to reopen filed by aliens who are outside the United States is unreasonable);
TRINA REALMUTO, PRACTICE ADVISORY: RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES AFTER PRE-
VAILING IN FEDERAL COURT (Legal Action Center 2009), available at http://www.legalac-
tioncenter.org/sites/default/files/acpa-11607.pdf. The most extensive discussion of the
problems facing this group of aliens comes from practice advisories and a Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) complaint filed in federal court by a number of groups repre-
sented by the New York University Immigrant Rights Clinic. See Complaint, Nat'l Immi-
gration Project of the Nat'l Lawyers Guild v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 11-cv-3235
(S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2011) [hereinafter FOIA Complaint]. That complaint alleges that fed-
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has analyzed whether any statutory or other legal basis exists to justify
the government's practice of classifying such immigrants as arriving
aliens. Similarly, neither the BIA nor any court of appeals has issued an
authoritative opinion regarding the government's practice.
This Article undertakes that analysis by examining the competing argu-
ments for and against applying inadmissibility standards to non-citizens
who prevail from abroad. It concludes that the practice of reclassifying
such aliens as arriving aliens lacks a statutory basis and violates the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. Non-citi-
zens who win their appeals while abroad should be fully restored to their
prior status, which means that they should be subject to the same de-
portability standards that applied the first time around rather than to the
more stringent inadmissibility standards. That is not to suggest that inad-
missibility and deportability standards must be collapsed together in all
circumstances. There may be legitimate reasons for treating arriving
aliens differently from aliens already present in the United States. What
is important is that the government not be allowed to apply a different set
of standards to an individual during different stages of the same case. A
non-citizen should not suffer prejudice by virtue of having been wrong-
fully removed from the United States.
Part II provides statutory background by detailing the differences be-
tween the INA's deportability and inadmissibility standards and by dis-
cussing the procedures for allowing aliens to challenge deportation orders
from abroad that were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).
Part III documents how the government often has classified aliens who
win their appeals from abroad as arriving aliens, with the consequence
that those aliens now become subject to the Act's inadmissibility stan-
dards when they were formerly subject to the Act's deportability stan-
dards. Part III also explores the significance of the government's practice
by discussing the high volume of appeals of deportation orders and the
high rate of federal court reversals.
Part IV evaluates the competing arguments concerning whether the
INA and IIRIRA permit the government to apply inadmissibility stan-
dards to aliens who prevail from abroad and concludes that the govern-
ment's practice is not authorized by statute. First, applying
inadmissibility standards appears to be inconsistent with congressional in-
tent to allow aliens to fully vindicate their rights from abroad. Congress
specifically amended the INA to remove the automatic right to a stay of
removal and replace it with a new right to pursue a petition for review
from abroad following deportation. Second, although proponents of ap-
plying inadmissibility standards can point to support in the statutory text,
those portions of the statute were intended to apply only to voluntary
eral agencies have failed to adequately assist aliens in returning to the United States after
they win their appeals and details how the government has stated on repeated occasions
that successful aliens who do return will be treated as arriving aliens. Id. at 2-4.
2012]
SMU LAW REVIEW
removals rather than to involuntary removals that are subsequently
invalidated.
Part V addresses the constitutional concerns raised by the govern-
ment's approach. First, allowing the government to remove a non-citizen
and then rely on that removal order after it is subsequently overturned to
prevent him or her from reentering substantially curtails the non-citizen's
right to judicial review in a way that gives rise to significant due process
concerns. Second, the practice creates potential equal protection
problems by applying the Act's more favorable deportability standards to
aliens who win their appeals while inside the United States and applying
the Act's far more restrictive inadmissibility standards to aliens who win
after removal. This part questions whether a rational basis exists for this
distinction and concludes that in the absence of any legitimate rationale,
the government's practice violates equal protection.
Part VI discusses potential solutions and examines the feasibility of re-
quiring the government to continue to apply deportability standards to
aliens who prevail from abroad.
II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
The problem facing aliens who prevail in their petitions for review from
abroad stems from two unrelated portions of the INA: the procedural
rules regarding who can file a petition for review and the substantive
rules regarding the conduct that renders an alien deportable or inadmissi-
ble. This part first describes the procedural framework for filing petitions
for review and then identifies the differences between the Act's de-
portability and inadmissibility standards.
A. THE RIGHT TO PURSUE A PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM ABROAD
An alien lawfully residing in the United States enjoys certain protec-
tions prior to deportation. If the government believes that a legal resi-
dent is deportable, it initiates a deportation proceeding by filing a Notice
to Appear that identifies the alleged grounds for deportation. 29 Grounds
for deportation can range from overstaying a visa to becoming a public
charge to committing various criminal offenses.30 The alien then appears
before an immigration judge. In the case of an LPR, the government
must prove deportability by "clear and convincing evidence. '3 1 The im-
migration judge issues a decision, and either the government or the alien
can appeal that decision to the BIA.32 If the BIA finds that the alien is
not deportable, that is the end of the matter and the deportation proceed-
ings are terminated. If the BIA finds that the alien is deportable, then
29. 8 C.F.R. § 1239.1(a) (2011).
30. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)-(b) (2006).
31. Id. § 1229a(c)(3)(A); accord Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966) ("[N]o de-
portation order may be entered unless it is found by clear, unequivocal, and convincing
evidence that the facts alleged as grounds for deportation are true.").
32. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(a)(1) (2011).
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the alien has the right to seek review in a federal court of appeals by filing
a petition for review. 33
While a deportation proceeding is pending before the immigration
judge or the BIA, the alien automatically receives a stay of removal,
meaning that the alien cannot be deported until the BIA issues a final
decision.34 Prior to 1996, the process was similar for petitions for review
in the courts of appeals. At that time, an alien could only pursue a peti-
tion for review from within the United States, and the alien's departure
from the country constituted an automatic withdrawal of the petition. 3
5
Because the alien could not pursue a petition for review from abroad, any
alien who filed a petition automatically received a stay of removal pend-
ing a decision on the petition.3 6
That structure changed following Congress's enactment of IIRIRA in
1996. Congress believed that too often aliens were using litigation as a
delay tactic to avoid removal and wished to speed up the removal pro-
cess. 37 In IIRIRA, Congress "inverted these provisions to allow for more
prompt removal."' 38 Specifically, Congress permitted aliens to pursue pe-
titions for review from abroad by repealing the ban on post-departure
petitions for review.39 Accompanying that change, Congress removed
the automatic stay provision and instead provided that a petition for re-
view "does not stay the removal of an alien ... unless the court orders
otherwise. ' 40 Under current law, aliens can still seek a stay, but the deci-
sion to grant or deny a stay is discretionary rather than automatic. 41 The
court's discretion is governed by the traditional test for stays, which looks
to: (1) whether the party seeking the stay has made a "strong showing" of
the likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the party will suffer
"irreparable injury" in the absence of a stay; (3) whether the stay will
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (2006) (establishing the requirements for filing a petition for
review).
34. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(a) (2011).
35. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (1994) (repealed 1996) ("An order of deportation or of exclu-
sion shall not be reviewed by any court ... if [the alien] has departed from the United
States after the issuance of the order."). See also Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 423-25
(2009) (describing the changes effected by the 1996 amendments).
36. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(3) (1994) (repealed 1996) ("The service of the petition for
review ... shall stay the deportation of the alien pending determination of the petition by
the court, unless the court otherwise directs.").
37. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 104-249, at 1 (1996) (identifying the need to expedite "the
removal of excludable and deportable aliens" as one of the goals of IIRIRA); H.R. REP.
No. 104-469(I), at 122 (1996) (explaining how aliens manipulated the deportation system
to delay proceedings and to find ways to avoid deportation). See also Reno v. Arab-Am.
Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 490 (1999) (noting that "[p]ostponing justifiable
deportation (in the hope that the alien's status will change-by, for example, marriage to
an American citizen-or simply with the object of extending the alien's unlawful stay) is
often the principal object of resistance to a deportation proceeding").
38. Nken, 556 U.S. at 424.
39. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA),
Pub. L. No. 104-208 § 306(b), 110 Stat. 3009-612 (1996) (repealing 8 U.S.C. § 1105a); see
also Nken, 556 U.S. at 423-25 (describing the amendments).
40. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B) (2006); see also Nken, 556 U.S. at 423-25.
41. Nken, 556 U.S. at 433.
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substantially injure other parties to the proceeding; and (4) whether the
public interest supports granting a stay.42 As the Supreme Court recently
indicated, the standard is not an easy one to meet.43
Congress had two principal aims regarding this aspect of the 1996
amendments. First, Congress sought to quicken the pace of removal by
eliminating the right to an automatic stay during the pendency of a peti-
tion for review. 44 Eliminating the automatic stay makes it harder for
aliens to use legal proceedings solely for the purpose of delay. It also
saves the government the substantial expense of housing aliens, many of
whom are kept in prison on immigration detainers for the duration of
their proceedings. 45 Second, allowing aliens to litigate their appeals fol-
lowing removal helps maintain the accuracy of removal determinations.4 6
In other words, the gravamen of the amendments is that the act of depor-
tation should not affect an alien's ability to fully vindicate his or her
rights. The amendments allow the government to execute deportation
orders more quickly but without prejudice to aliens, who can still obtain
full relief if they win their appeal after being deported.
B. DEPORTABILITY VS. INADMISSIBILITY
Prior to 1996, cases involving aliens seeking entry into the United
States were dealt with separately from cases involving aliens whom the
government was seeking to remove from the United States. The former
were handled in what were known as "exclusion" proceedings, and the
latter were handled in what were known as "deportation" proceedings.4 7
Substantive inadmissibility standards governed exclusion proceedings,48
while substantive deportability standards governed deportation proceed-
ings.49 In 1996, Congress scrapped the separate proceedings and created
42. Id. at 434.
43. Id. at 434-35.
44. Lin v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 681 F.3d 1236, 1240 (11th Cir. 2012).
45. Federal law requires the government to detain certain classes of individuals, pri-
marily those who have committed certain types of crimes such as drug crimes, for the
duration of proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2006). Even aliens not subject to
mandatory detention may still be incarcerated while their proceedings are ongoing if the
immigration judge determines that they should not be released on bond, or if they cannot
afford the bond that the immigration judge sets. See id. § 1226(a) (authorizing the Attor-
ney General to detain any alien who has pending removal proceedings). For a more gen-
eral discussion and critique of federal immigration detention policies, see Anil Kalhan,
Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42 (2010), available at
http://www.columbialawreview.org/sidebar/volume/110/42_AnilKalhan.pdf.
46. See, e.g., Prestol Espinal v. Attorney Gen., 653 F.3d 213, 222-23 (3d Cir. 2011)
(identifying "IIRIRA's dual objectives 'to expedite the physical removal of those aliens not
entitled to admission to the United States, while at the same time increasing the accuracy
of such determinations"' (quoting Coyt v. Holder, 593 F.3d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 2010))).
47. See Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 479 (2011) (describing the different pro-
ceedings); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25 (1982) ("The deportation hearing is the
usual means of proceeding against an alien already physically in the United States, and the
exclusion hearing is the usual means of proceeding against an alien outside the United
States seeking admission.").
48. These standards are now codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2006).
49. These standards are now codified at Id. § 1227.
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a single "removal" proceeding to govern both admission and
deportation. 50
Congress, however, retained the distinct admissibility and removability
standards. In many ways, the two standards overlap. For example, an
alien who has been convicted of certain types of crimes, such as drug
crimes, violent crimes, and "crimes of moral turpitude," can be both inad-
missible and deportable.51 Similarly, aliens who have become, or are at
risk of becoming, a public charge or who present a risk to national secur-
ity are both inadmissible and deportable. 52
In other important ways, however, the two standards diverge. The
grounds for inadmissibility are generally considered to be broader than
the grounds for deportability.5 3 Thus, there are numerous ways in which
conduct that makes a person inadmissible would not make the same per-
son deportable, creating what Professor Nancy Morawetz termed the "in-
admissibility gap."'54
First, the criminal grounds for deportability and inadmissibility differ in
significant ways. As the example at the beginning of this Article shows,
while drug crimes render an individual both inadmissible and deportable,
the deportability grounds provide an exception for a single offense in-
volving possession of thirty grams or less of marijuana. 55 The inadmissi-
bility grounds, however, provide no parallel exception. 56
50. See id. § 1229a(a).
51. See id. §§ 1182(a), 1227(a).
52. See id. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (making public charges inadmissible); Id. § 1227(a)(5)
(making public charges deportable); Id. § 1182(a)(3) (making national security threats
inadmissible); Id. § 1227(a)(4) (making national security threats deportable). Even there,
however, differences persist. A non-citizen is inadmissible if the government determines
simply that the non-citizen is a risk of becoming a public charge after entry. By contrast, a
non-citizen is deportable as a public charge only if the non-citizen becomes a public charge
"within five years" of the date of entry and fails to show that the causes did not arise after
entering the United States. Id. § 1227(a)(5).
53. See, e.g., Evelyn H. Cruz, Because You're Mine, I Walk the Line: The Trials and
Tribulations of the Family Visa Program, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 155, 161 n.46 (2010)
("Grounds of inadmissibility do not always mirror grounds of deportability and generally
are more expansive.").
54. See Morawetz, supra note 19, at 207.
55. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).
56. Id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). While the inadmissibility grounds permit an alien to
seek a waiver of a conviction involving possession of thirty grams or less of marijuana, the
waiver is discretionary, and an alien is eligible only if the conviction occurred more than 15
years before the date of the alien's application for admission and the alien demonstrates
that he or she has been rehabilitated. Id. § 1182(h)(1)(A). Moreover, while the govern-
ment carries the burden of proving that an offense does not involve thirty grams or less of
marijuana in a deportation proceeding, the alien bears the burden of proof when seeking a
discretionary waiver and must affirmatively demonstrate that the conviction did involve
thirty grams or less of marijuana. Compare Medina v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 1063, 1065 n.5
(9th Cir. 2005) (holding that, in a deportation hearing, "[t]he government bears the burden
of establishing that an alien's conviction does not fall within the exception for possession of
30 grams or less of marijuana."); Sandoval v. Ashcroft, 240 F.3d 577, 581 (7th Cir. 2001);
with, In re Mendez-Moralez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 296, 299-300 (B.I.A. 1996) (holding that the




Another important difference involves crimes of moral turpitude. This
is a broad category that includes virtually any crime that is done know-
ingly and that is contrary to generally accepted views of morality.5 7 An
alien generally is inadmissible if the alien has committed a single crime of
moral turpitude. 58 By contrast, an alien ordinarily is not deportable un-
less he or she has been convicted of two crimes of moral turpitude.59 The
only time a single conviction for a crime of moral turpitude will make an
alien deportable is if the conviction occurred within the first five years of
the alien's admission and was for a crime with a maximum penalty of one
year or more. 60 Moreover, if an alien has been convicted of two crimes of
moral turpitude that happen to arise out of a single scheme of criminal
misconduct, then the alien is not deportable. 61 Furthermore, while an
alien who has been convicted of two or more offenses of any type with an
aggregate prison sentence, active or suspended, of five years or more is
inadmissible, there is no parallel ground of deportability. 62
In addition, criminal deportability grounds require a higher level of
proof than criminal inadmissibility grounds. In general, criminal de-
portability grounds require proof of an actual conviction. 63 By contrast,
an alien will be inadmissible not only if the alien has been convicted of a
drug crime or a crime of moral turpitude, but also if the alien admits
committing acts constituting such an offense, even if the alien was never
tried or convicted. 64 Other inadmissibility grounds do not require the
alien to admit any criminal conduct at all. For example, an individual is
inadmissible when the government "knows or has reason to believe" that
the individual is going to engage in drug trafficking, money laundering, or
human trafficking. 65
Second, there are certain health-related grounds that make an individ-
ual inadmissible but not deportable. Specifically, any individual with a
communicable disease; a "physical or mental disorder" that may pose a
threat to the property, safety, or welfare of others; or a history of drug
use or addiction is inadmissible. 66 Because immigration officers may con-
sider a history of alcohol addiction to be a mental disorder, especially if
57. See, e.g., In re Franklin, 20 I. & N. Dec. 867, 868 (B.I.A. 1994) ("Moral turpitude
refers generally to conduct which is inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the
accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in general."),
affd, 72 F.3d 571 (8th Cir. 1995).
58. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i). The inadmissibility grounds provide for a "petty of-
fense" exception whereby a crime of moral turpitude will not render an individual inadmis-
sible. Id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II). However, the exception only applies if (a) the individual
has committed no other crime, (b) the crime carries a maximum penalty of one year or less,
and (c) the individual was not sentenced to more than six months in prison. Id.
59. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).
60. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).
61. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).
62. Id. § 1182(a)(2)(B).
63. Id. § 1227(a)(2). The Section identifies the criminal grounds of deportability and
covers aliens who have been "convicted" of the crimes specified in that provision.
64. See id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i).
65. Id. § 1182(a)(2)(C), (H)-(I).
66. Id. § 1182(a)(1).
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there is evidence that the alien has a history of driving while intoxi-
cated,67 this ground can provide a broad basis for exclusion.
To be sure, the differences work in the other direction as well. Some
criminal convictions may render an alien deportable but not inadmissible.
An alien is deportable, but not inadmissible, if the alien has been con-
victed of an "aggravated felony" and was sentenced to a year or more in
prison.68 The INA definition of an aggravated felony includes a list of
various types of more serious crimes. 69 Most aggravated felonies, how-
ever, are also likely to qualify as crimes of moral turpitude and thus
would render an alien inadmissible notwithstanding the lack of an aggra-
vated felony ground for inadmissibility.70 The one major exception is
firearms offenses, which are deportable offenses but not crimes of moral
turpitude, and therefore do not render an individual inadmissible. 71
In short, an alien's ability to reside in the United States may turn on
whether the alien is subject to inadmissibility grounds or deportability
grounds. In many cases, this classification is uncontroversial. For an
alien who was lawfully admitted into the United States and is still present
there, deportability grounds apply. For aliens who have never been to
the United States and are seeking to enter for the first time, inadmissibil-
ity grounds apply. Uncertainty arises, however, where an alien who was
previously present in the United States is found deportable and removed
from the United States, and then seeks to return to the United States
after successfully overturning the order of deportation from abroad. As
explored in the next part, the federal government repeatedly has taken
the position that returning aliens in such circumstances are subject to the
more stringent inadmissibility standards than to the deportability stan-
dards that applied when the alien was originally removed. The effect is
that certain aliens who were unlawfully removed will find that the fact of
their mistaken removal will ironically bar them from reentering the
country.
III. THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTIONS AND THEIR EFFECTS
The government's reliance on invalidated deportation orders to pro-
hibit wrongly deported non-citizens from returning to the United States
significantly harms those non-citizens who should otherwise have the op-
tion to reenter. According to the government's public pronouncements,
however, this issue should not exist at all. In public statements, the gov-
67. See Memorandum from William R. Yates, Assoc. Dir. of Operations, U.S. Citizen-
ship & Immigration Servs., available at http://search.aila.org (accessed by searching for
Doc. No. 04022362; online registration is required).
68. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
69. Id. § 1101(a)(43) (providing a list of criminal offenses that constitute aggravated
felonies).
70. See, e.g., Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 482 (2011) (noting that almost all
criminal convictions that make an alien deportable also constitute crimes of moral
turpitude).
71. See In re Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. 262, 282 n.4 (B.I.A. 1990) (stating
that an alien convicted of a firearms offense is deportable but not inadmissible).
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ernment has affirmed that aliens who win their cases following deporta-
tion should be restored to their prior status. For example, in its briefing
to the Supreme Court in Nken v. Holder,72 the government stated that its
"policy and practice" is to "accord[ ] aliens who were removed pending
judicial review but then prevailed before the courts effective relief by,
inter alia, facilitating the alien's return to the United States by parole
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) if necessary, and according them the status
they had at the time of removal. '73 Thus, an alien who had a status as an
LPR before deportation should, according to the government, be re-
stored to LPR status upon winning his or her appeal. In Nken, the Su-
preme Court specifically relied on the government's representation
regarding restoration of pre-removal status in holding that deportation
does not cause irreparable injury that would justify a stay of removal.74
The government's statement in Nken, however, does not appear to be
consistent with actual practice. In contrast to its public statements, the
government often has accorded a lesser status to prevailing aliens, and
the government's actions have broad implications for the large number of
aliens who challenge deportation orders from abroad.
A. THE GOVERNMENT'S PRACTICE
The government's stated "policy and practice" of restoring aliens to
their prior status and facilitating their return seems inconsistent with its
actual policy and practice. As extensively documented in a Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit filed recently by a coalition of immi-
grants' rights organizations, the federal government appears to have ac-
ted contrary to its statement in Nken that it restores prevailing aliens to
their prior status.75 The complaint, accompanied by numerous affidavits
and other documentary evidence, asserted that the government's state-
ment in Nken has no clear basis.76
72. 556 U.S. 418, 418 (2009).
73. Brief for Respondent at 22, Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) (No. 08-681), 2009
WL 45980, at *44. See also Respondent's Opposition to Petitioner's Motion to Amend the
Court's December 22, 2008 Decision at 11, Sandoval-Macias v. Mukasey, 304 F. App'x 558
(9th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-71354) ("[O]nce the Court's mandate issues in this case, there will
no longer be a final order of removal against Sandoval and his status as a lawful permanent
resident will be restored, along with his entitlement to evidence demonstrating that
status.").
74. Nken, 556 U.S. at 435. Other courts similarly have relied on the government's
statement in Nken that an alien is returned to the same status as he had prior to removal
when he prevails on a petition for review. See, e.g., Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962,
969 (9th Cir. 2011); Rodriguez-Barajas v. Holder, 624 F.3d 678, 681 n.3 (5th Cir. 2010); see
also Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216, 1218 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding that if the petitioner
prevailed before the court, his "status as a legal permanent resident would be restored and
he could return to the United States").
75. FOIA Complaint, supra note 28, 11 1-6; accord REALMUTO, supra note 28, at 1
("There are no formal procedures for arranging the return of someone who has been
deported.").
76. FOIA Complaint, supra note 28, 5. The district court overseeing the FOIA liti-
gation recently ordered the federal government to disclose certain factual information re-
garding the underlying basis for its statement in Nken. See Nat'l Immigration Project of
the Nat'l Lawyers Guild v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 842 F. Supp. 2d 720 (S.D.N.Y.
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It appears that the government has lacked a coherent or consistent pol-
icy regarding how to treat aliens who win their petitions for review from
abroad. Instead, it seems that government attorneys for the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) have broad discretion to decide what status
to accord such aliens. Consequently, in recent years, government attor-
neys have repeatedly taken the position that such aliens, because they are
now outside the United States, are properly classified as arriving aliens
who are subject to inadmissibility standards rather than deportability
standards. Specifically, the government has taken the position that it can-
not restore an alien to the status of being lawfully inside the United
States, even if the alien possessed such status prior to the initiation of
removal proceedings. 77 In one internal government e-mail communica-
tion, a federal official indicated that the only available relief would be to
treat the alien as "an arriving alien, which would not be restoring him to
the status quo that existed when he was improperly removed. a7 8 In a
number of cases, the government has asserted that prevailing aliens, in-
cluding LPRs, should not be allowed to return because they are inadmis-
sible, or it has taken the position that post-deportation proceedings
should be dismissed as moot because even if the alien prevailed and
regained LPR status, the alien nonetheless would be inadmissible. 79 In
another case, an immigration judge found that a prevailing alien who had
his deportation order overturned was inadmissible under a statutory pro-
vision that makes any previously deported alien inadmissible unless the
alien obtains permission to return from the Attorney General.8 0 In an-
other case, even where the government agreed that an alien should be
restored to his LPR status after successfully showing that his conviction
was not an aggravated felony, it took the position that he could not reside
in the United States because his conviction was a crime involving moral
turpitude. 81 Thus, the government indicated that it was applying the in-
admissibility standards that make a single moral turpitude conviction re-
movable rather than the deportability standards that ordinarily require
2012). The government has decided not to appeal that order. See Dreeben Letter, supra
note 23, at 2 n.2.
77. See FOIA Complaint, supra note 28, exhibit Y (letter from Joseph D. Hardy, Trial
Att'y, Office of Immigration Litig., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit) ("[T]here is no remedy that can return him to the status he had prior to
his removal, i.e., an alien seeking to remain in the United States pending adjudication of an
application for adjustment of status in conjunction with a discretionary waiver.").
78. Id. exhibit CC.
79. Id. 36 (providing examples); Id. exhibit E 9 (Declaration of Barbara Hines); Id.
exhibit F 7 (Declaration of Maile M. Hirota); Id. exhibit G 1$ 28-31 (Declaration of
Joseph Hohenstein); Press Release, NYU Immigrant Rights Clinic, Barriers to Return Af-
ter Successfully Challenging a Removal Order from Outside the U.S., at 5 (May 16, 2011),
available at http://nationalimmigrationproject.org/legalresourceslcdNIP-v._DHSFOIA_
ComplaintSummary.pdf [hereinafter FOIA Press Release].
80. In re G-G-M-, Interlocutory Ruling on Grounds of Inadmissibility, 3-4 (U.S. Im-
migr. Ct. Oct. 19, 2011) [hereinafter G-G-M- Interlocutory Order] (on file with author).




two moral turpitude convictions. 82
Even when the government has consented to an alien's return, it often
has taken the position that the only way an alien can return is through
what is known as "parole. '83 By entering as a parolee an alien is treated
as an arriving alien who must apply for admission.84 Parole is not an
admission at all and does not confer any immigration status on the alien.
Rather, it permits a temporary reentry, usually for a period of one year or
less, for reasons of exigency-such as the need to participate in legal pro-
ceedings or so the alien can obtain urgent and necessary medical care. 85
Once parole expires, the alien loses any right to stay in the United States
and is treated as an applicant for admission subject to inadmissibility
standards.86 And if the alien is inadmissible though not deportable, the
alien ultimately cannot remain in the United States. In several cases, the
government assented to an alien's return only through the issuance of
parole. 87
In short, although it has not done so in every case, the government
repeatedly has taken the position that aliens who were lawful residents
before removal are now applicants for admission following removal, even
though none of these aliens would have been removed but for the faulty
deportation orders that these aliens have succeeded in overturning.
As this article was going to press, the government acknowledged in
response to the FOIA litigation that, notwithstanding its statements in
Nken, it had not always restored prevailing aliens to their prior status.88
As a result, the government announced that it would "take steps going
forward to ensure that aliens who prevail on judicial review are able to
timely return to the United States."' 89 Specifically, the government cited
a new directive issued by the Department of Homeland Security's Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) branch in which ICE committed
82. Id.
83. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (2006).
84. REALMUTO, supra note 28, at 4 ("[B]ecause parolees are subject to the grounds of
inadmissibility, not deportability, entering as a parolee may negatively impact the charges
in the Notice to Appear and the type of relief available.").
85. See, e.g., Amanullah v. Nelson, 811 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1987) ("The legislative his-
tory of the parole statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) [(1982)], demonstrates beyond cavil that
Congress consistently visualized parole as an indulgence to be granted only occasionally, in
the case of rare and exigent circumstances, and only when it would plainly serve the public
interest.").
86. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (2006); FOIA Press Release, supra note 79, at 5 (noting that
"many individuals are returned through parole, which subjects an individual to treatment
as an 'arriving alien' and grounds of inadmissibility"); see also Nat'l Immigration Project of
the Nat'l Lawyers Guild v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 842 F. Supp. 2d 720, 724
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (noting that government records "admit that the Government's use of
parole would not restore the status that removed aliens had prior to their removal").
87. FOIA Press Release, supra note 79, at 5; FOIA Complaint, supra note 28, exhibits
A, B, E, L, AA, CC, DD, EE.
88. Dreeben Letter, supra note 23, at 4 ("[T]he government is not confident that the
process for returning removed aliens, either at the time its brief was filed or during the





to facilitating certain aliens' return to the United States, and to treating
prevailing aliens "as having reverted to the immigration status he or she
held" prior to removal. 90
These new steps by the government should be applauded, and hope-
fully they will mitigate the scope of the inadmissibility gap problem.
However, the new measures do not guarantee that this problem will dis-
appear. First, by their own terms, the new measures do not apply to all
prevailing aliens. Rather, the ICE statement indicates only that "ICE will
facilitate the alien's return to the United States if either the court's deci-
sion restores the alien to LPR status, or the alien's presence is necessary
for continued administrative removal proceedings."91 However, there
are many immigrants, such as individuals who have student or spousal
visas, who lawfully reside in the United States but are not LPRs. If such
aliens are wrongfully deported and prevail on a petition for review fol-
lowing deportation, it is not clear that the policy requires the government
to facilitate their return.92 Additionally, whether ICE deems an alien's
presence in the United States necessary for continued removal proceed-
ings begs the question of what type of proceedings the alien would face.
In other words, the government's statement does not appear to determine
whether the prevailing alien would face deportability charges or inadmis-
sibility charges upon return. Furthermore, if a government attorney de-
cides that the prevailing alien is inadmissible, that attorney may
determine that the alien cannot reenter and therefore his or her presence
is not necessary for continued administrative proceedings. Thus, the gov-
ernment's actions, while laudable, also have been criticized as incomplete
and deficient for continuing to vest many decisions about an alien's re-
turn with the agency's discretion. 93
Second, although the new policies state that the government will treat
prevailing aliens as having been restored to their prior status, restoring an
alien to his or her prior status does not on its own solve the inadmissibil-
ity gap problem. There are ways in which charging prevailing aliens
under inadmissibility standards is perfectly consistent with this policy. As
90. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DIRECTIVE 11061.1, FACILITAT-
ING THE RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES OF CERTAIN LAWFULLY REMOVED ALIENS 2(Feb. 24, 2012), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/dro-policy-memos/11061.1_cur-
rentpolicy-facilitating.return.pdf [hereinafter ICE DIRECTIVE 11061.1]; accord Dreeben
Letter, supra note 23, at 4 (citing the ICE Directive).
91. ICE DIRECTIVE 11061.1, supra note 90, 2.
92. In a "Frequently Asked Questions about ICE Policy Directive Number 11061.1,"
document, ICE indicates that it will facilitate return of any prevailing alien with a lawful
immigration status that has not expired. FAQS about ICE Policy Directive Number
11061.1, Facilitating the Return to the United States of Certain Lawfully Removed Aliens,
ICE, http://www.ice.gov/about/offices/enforcement-removal-operations/publicadvocate/
faq.htm (last visited July 5, 2012). However, it is not clear that the policy itself requires
returning anyone other than lawful permanent residents.
93. See Transcript of Hearing at 19:6-19:17, Nat'l Immigration Project of the Nat'l
Lawyers Guild v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 11-cv-3235 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2012)
(noting that the new policies "do not ensure effective relief for all individuals who prevail




explained below,94 the government may still assert that aliens who are
restored to lawful permanent resident status must be subject to inadmissi-
bility standards by virtue of their length of time away from the United
States or their prior criminal record. And the government in fact has
done so in prior cases. 95
Third, the government's new statements never explicitly address the
inadmissibility gap problem itself, nor the legality of charging prevailing
aliens under inadmissibility standards. The government did not issue its
new measures because it felt compelled to do so as a matter of law, under
either statute or the Constitution. Rather, the government has suggested
this issue "was not addressed by statute. ' 96 In other words, if the govern-
ment believes that either option is legally appropriate, then it can revert
to its prior practice just as easily as it adopted its new one. As a result, it
is important to examine the statutory and constitutional problems with
subjecting prevailing aliens to inadmissibility standards.
Furthermore, failing to explicitly address the inadmissibility gap leaves
open the possibility that the government can try to accomplish through
the back door what it may no longer do through the front door. This is
because the deportability standards make an individual deportable if the
individual was inadmissible at the time of entering the country. 97 Thus, if
an alien who is subject to the inadmissibility gap is treated as reentering
the United States (even lawfully) after his petition for review is granted
and ICE facilitates return, the government may have grounds to argue
that the alien is still deportable by virtue of having committed an inad-
missible (but not deportable) offense at the time the alien reentered the
United States following a victory in the court of appeals. Even aliens
who are restored to their prior status and not charged as arriving aliens
could still find themselves unable to return and remain in the United
States. While the idea that the government would attempt such an end
run may sound farfetched, it has taken such a position before. 98 Thus, at
this point, it is still too early to tell what effect the government's new
94. See infra Part IV.B.1.
95. See id. In its "Frequently Asked Questions" document regarding the new direc-
tive, ICE states that it will not treat a prevailing alien as an arriving alien unless the alien
was charged as an arriving alien prior to removal. FAQs, supra note 92. It is not clear how
that statement interacts with statutory provisions in the INA that allow LPRs to be treated
as applicants for admission in certain circumstances. See infra Part IV.B.1.
96. Dreeben Letter, supra note 23, at 2.
97. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) (2006) ("Any alien who at the time of entry or adjust-
ment of status was within one or more of the classes of aliens inadmissible by the law
existing at such time is deportable.").
98. See, e.g., Memorandum from William E. Lore, Senior Attorney, U.S. Immigration
& Customs Enforcement, Dep't of Homeland Sec., at 5-6, In re G-G-M- (Sept. 28, 2011)
[hereinafter DHS Memorandum] (on file with author). In that case, the government ar-
gued that even if a prevailing alien lawfully reentered the United States after his removal
order was vacated, he should be charged as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) for
having committed a single crime of moral turpitude and a single drug offense-regardless




pronouncements will have and how significantly they will affect the "in-
admissibility gap" problem.
B. THE EFFECT ON PREVIOUSLY DEPORTED ALIENS
The effects of the "inadmissibility gap" threaten to substantially
prejudice the rights of aliens who win their cases after being deported.
Aliens who are not deportable but are inadmissible might find themselves
unable to return to the United States even though the only reason they
were removed was because of an erroneous deportation order. In effect,
an alien's now defunct deportation order may continue to have adverse
consequences by preventing the alien from returning to the United
States.
From the non-citizen's perspective, the stakes involved could not be
higher. Deportation is one of the most severe punishments that can be-
fall a non-citizen, and the consequences of deportation "often far out-
weigh those of many criminal convictions. "99 Deportation is the
equivalent of banishment or exile. It results in the forcible removal from
one's home and country of residence, as well as the severance of family,
community, and business relationships.100 According to Professor Peter
Markowitz, deportation means that "[1lawful immigrants can face life
sentences of banishment from their homes, families, and livelihoods in
the United States and can potentially be sent to countries they have not
visited since childhood, where they: have no family, do not speak the lan-
guage, and can face serious persecution or death."' 0 1 Deported individu-
als may never see their family again and may be forced to live in a place
that often feels like a completely foreign land. Individuals who have been
deported while their challenges were pending in court have found that
they are unable to integrate into a foreign society and have suffered from
unemployment, destitution, homelessness, and physical violence.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to systematically quantify the number of
wrongly deported aliens who have been prevented from returning be-
cause they fall in the inadmissibility gap. First, the lack of data is due in
part to the executive branch's refusal to disclose information about its
policies for dealing with aliens who prevail post-deportation.10 2 Immigra-
99. Problems with ICE Interrogation, Detention and Removal Procedures: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., and Int'l Law of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 77-78 (2008) (statement of Rachel E. Rosen-
bloom, Human Rights Fellow and Supervising Attorney, Center for Human Rights and
International Justice at Boston College).
100. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 759 (1893) (Field, J., dis-
senting) ("As to its cruelty, nothing can exceed a forcible deportation from a country of
one's residence, and the breaking up of all the relations of friendship, family, and business
. . . . .).
101. Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1301-02
(2011); accord Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945) ("[D]eportation may result in the
loss 'of all that makes life worth living.'") (quoting Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284
(1922)).
102. See Nat'l Immigration Project of the Nat'l Lawyers Guild v. U.S. Dep't of Home-
land Sec., 842 F. Supp. 2d 720 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (describing the executive branch's refusal to
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tion advocates and attorneys have requested that the government provide
the number, or even a general estimate, of wrongly deported aliens who
remain outside the United States, but the government has refused to re-
spond.10 3 It is not even clear that the federal government keeps such
data.
Nor is it possible to determine the number of wrongly deported aliens
who remain outside the United States by searching immigration court or
BIA case records. Unlike judicial case records, immigration court
records are not public documents. Even if the files were publicly accessi-
ble, such files may not always indicate whether or not an individual has
been deported or is still in the United States.10 4
What is known and undisputed is that the effects are much greater than
anyone anticipated. The reason, as detailed below, is that since the
IIRIRA amendments of 1996 the volume of petitions for review challeng-
ing deportation orders has exploded with a similarly dramatic increase in
appellate court reversals of deportation orders. Moreover, because immi-
gration judges have been criticized by the courts of appeals for being er-
ror-prone and engaging in sloppy reasoning, the reversal rate in
deportation cases (as much as 40% in some circuits) is much higher than
the overall reversal rate in the court of appeals. 0 5 Federal courts grant
more than 1,000 petitions for review a year, a significant number of which
disclose information regarding its policies for returning aliens who successfully challenge
deportation orders from abroad).
103. Telephone Interview with Jessica Chicco, Human Rights Fellow & Supervising At-
torney, Ctr. for Human Rights and Int'l Justice, Bos. Coll. (Mar. 15, 2012) (statement from
Ms. Chicco explaining that the federal government has rebuffed efforts by immigration
advocates to determine the number of wrongly deported aliens who have been unable to
return to the United States).
104. See id. Once a case ends up in federal court on a petition for review, then the
court file may be accessed by visiting the courthouse. However, appellate case files are
unlikely to have relevant documents because the file will only contain information through
the court's final decision on the petition for review. The file therefore will not contain
information about whether an alien who wins a petition for review is subsequently charged
as being inadmissible. Moreover, while most other case files are electronically searchable
through the Public Access to Court Records (PACER) system, Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 25 restricts the public from electronic access to most portions of immigration
case files, including the entire administrative record. See AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAW
FOUN. LEGAL ACTION CTR., PRACTICE ADVISORY: ELECTRONIC FILING AND ACCESS TO
ELECTRONIC FEDERAL COURT DOCUMENTS, 3-4 (2009), available at http://www.legalac-
tioncenter.org/sites/default/files/pa-ElectronicFiling-20090413.pdf.
105. The reversal rate of deportation decisions has been as high as 20%-40% depend-
ing on the circuit. See, e.g., Lenni B. Benson, Making Paper Dolls: How Restrictions on
Judicial Review and the Administrative Process Increase Immigration Cases in the Federal
Courts, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 37, 60 n.95 (2006-2007) [hereinafter Benson, Making Paper
Dolls] ("The rate or[sic] remand or reversal in the Second Circuit is 20%, and has reached
as high as 40% in the Seventh Circuit."). By contrast, the reversal rate is only 8.6% for
appeals as a whole and only 13.4% for administrative appeals, of which deportation ap-
peals comprise a large percentage. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, OFFICE OF





involve previously deported aliens.106 Moreover, the government's prac-
tice has implications for every non-citizen. Every alien who lives in the
United States or who may enter in the future could potentially land in the
inadmissibility gap, and therefore every alien must live in fear of the pos-
sibility of being wrongly deported and then prohibited from returning.
Prior to 1996, petitions for review were relatively rare. For example, in
the thirty-year period from 1972 to 2002, the Second Circuit, which has
one of the busiest immigration dockets in the nation, received only 2,360
petitions, for an average of just under eighty a year. 10 7 However, there
has been a "well-documented" explosion of petitions for review since the
IIRIRA reforms of 1996.108 One study shows that appeals of removal
orders increased by almost 1,000% from 1996 to 2006.109
Most commentators ascribe the bulk of the increase to a few causes.
One cause was the 1996 amendments themselves. IIRIRA enacted new
standards for deportation that were not clearly drafted and therefore in-
spired a great deal of litigation regarding whether aliens could properly
be found deportable under those new standards.' 10 IIRIRA also signifi-
cantly reduced opportunities for discretionary relief where an alien was
found deportable.11' By closing off other avenues for relief, the Act
pushed aliens to lodge more challenges to the finding of deportability
itself since that increasingly came to represent the only option for staying
in the country. In turn, immigration attorneys who had previously limited
their practice to the administrative level and shied away from filing peti-
tions in federal court became more comfortable with federal appellate
practice and began filing more and more petitions for review.l1 2
A second major cause was the adoption of new "streamlining" regula-
106. FOIA Complaint, supra note 28, 3 ("A significant number of [appellate reversals
of deportation orders] involve individuals who challenge their removability from outside
the United States.").
107. John R.B. Palmer, The Nature and Causes of the Immigration Surge in the Federal
Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Analysis, 51 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 13, 14 (2006-2007)
[hereinafter Palmer, Nature and Causes].
108. John R.B. Palmer, et al., Why Are So Many People Challenging Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in
Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMGR. L.J. 1, 8-9 & n.17 (2005) (citing numerous reports)
[hereinafter Palmer, Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals].
109. See Benson, Making Paper Dolls, supra note 105, at 39 (describing a 970% in-
crease in federal court appeals of removal orders since 1996).
110. See Rosenbloom, Remedies for the Wrongly Deported, supra note 28, 149-50 ("The
1996 legislation was hastily drafted and included numerous ambiguities. In the wake of its
passage, government attorneys aggressively pursued broad interpretations of the new
laws-interpretations that in many cases were later rejected by the courts.").
111. See id. (explaining that the 1996 amendments had the effect of "greatly expanding
the grounds of deportability and reducing the availability of discretionary relief").
112. See Benson, Making Paper Dolls, supra note 105, at 49-55; Palmer, Nature and
Causes, supra note 106, at 28 ("Lawyers who had previously practiced only at the adminis-
trative level moved into the courts of appeals for the first time to fill the demand. Lawyers




tions for the BIA in 2002.113 In order to reduce a backlog of more than
50,000 appeals, the 2002 regulations allowed single board members,
rather than three-member panels, to issue the bulk of decisions, and
greatly expanded the authority for board members to issue Affirmances
Without Opinion.114 The regulations also limited the scope of the
Board's review powers over immigration judge decisions. Whereas the
Board previously could review the entire decision de novo, the new regu-
lations required the Board to review factual findings under a deferential
"clear error" standard while preserving de novo review of legal claims. 1 5
The streamlining regulations also (and perhaps counter-intuitively) re-
duced the size of the Board from twenty-three members to eleven mem-
bers, and a number of commentators have suggested that the cuts were
politically motivated to remove those Board members who were gener-
ally the most sympathetic to aliens' claims.1 16
Consequently, the BIA began deciding more cases and ruled in favor
of the government more frequently. Soon after the streamlining regula-
tions went into effect, the BIA doubled its decision rate from 2,000 deci-
sions per month to 4,000.117 The percentage of BIA decisions in which it
ruled against the alien also increased substantially, from 75% in 2001 to
94%-98% for the years 2002 through 2004.118 The result was a substan-
tial increase in the number of deportations. While the government de-
ported 50,000 individuals in 1996, by 2010 that number increased to
400,000.119
Unsurprisingly, the volume of petitions for review filed in the federal
courts of appeals increased dramatically. Whereas the two years preced-
ing the streamlining reforms saw around 1,750 petitions filed per year,
since the reforms the number of petitions has ranged from a low of 8,446
petitions in 2003 to a high of 13,059 petitions filed in 2006, for an average
113. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Man-
agement, 67 Fed. Reg. 54878-01 (Aug. 26, 2002) [hereinafter BIA Streamlining
Regulations].
114. Palmer, Nature and Causes, supra note 107, at 18-19. Single-member decisions
now account for 94% of all BIA decisions. Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigra-
tion Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1657 (2010).
115. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)-(ii) (2006).
116. Benson, Making Paper Dolls, supra note 105, at 61; Susan Benesch, Due Process
and Decisionmaking in U.S. Immigration Adjudication, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 557, 560 (2007)
(noting that the departing Board members "were widely seen as 'the most immigrant-
friendly Board Members"').
117. Palmer, Nature and Causes, supra note 107, at 19-20.
118. See id. at 23-24; Palmer, Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals, supra note
107, at 55-57; see also Legomsky, supra note 114, at 1662 (noting that "the percentage of
cases in which the BIA reversed immigration judge decisions dropped precipitously after
the 2002 reforms").
119. Rosenbloom, Remedies for the Wrongly Deported, supra note 28, at 140; see also
Maria Baldini-Potermin, It's Time to Consider Automatic Stays of Removal: Petitions for
Review, Motions to Reopen, BIA Regulations, and the Race to the Courthouse, IMMIGR.
BRIEFINGS, Jan. 2010, at 1 (noting that the United States removed 356,739 individuals in
2008 and 369,483 individuals in 2009).
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of a five-fold increase. 120 As of 2008, petitions for review of removal or-
ders comprised over 18% of the federal appellate civil docket and more
than 88% of all appeals of agency action, though those numbers may
have dropped slightly in recent years. 121
The rise in petitions for review has been matched by a corresponding
rise in reversals of deportation orders. Erroneous removal orders have
adversely affected a substantial number of aliens. Appellate courts have
been reversing or remanding BIA decisions between 20% and 40% of the
time, depending on the circuit. 122 The courts are granting more than
1,000 petitions per year and have granted 7,000 petitions since 2005.123
In light of the BIA's procedural reforms, a higher-than-average rever-
sal rate is not entirely surprising. Shifting decision making from three
judges to one may increase the risk of overlooking errors in a decision at
the BIA level. Additionally, with the rising volume of decisions, Board
members are issuing so many decisions in such a short period of time that
they are bound to make errors. One commentator noted that the BIA's
caseload requires each Board member to issue fifty decisions per week,
which substantially limits the amount of time a Board member can spend
on any particular case.124 Further, the Department of Homeland Secur-
ity, which represents the government in immigration matters at the
agency level, has been criticized for refusing to exercise prosecutorial dis-
cretion, meaning that the agency aggressively pursues expansive pro-de-
portation interpretations of immigration statutes and pushes weak cases
120. Legomsky, supra note 114, at 1658; see also Benson, Making Paper Dolls, supra
note 105, at 47-48 (noting a nearly 357% increase in petitions for review between 2000 and
2005); Lenni B. Benson, You Can't Get There from Here: Managing Judicial Review of
Immigration Cases, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 405, 407-08 (2007) [hereinafter Benson, You
Can't Get There] (providing similar statistics). The increase reflects both the rise in deci-
sions by the BIA as well as an escalated rate of appeal, which has grown from around 6%
prior to the streamlining reforms to around 30% after the reforms. See Legomsky, supra
note 114, at 1659; Benson, You Can't Get There, supra, at 423; Palmer, Nature and Causes,
supra note 107, at 20.
121. Benson, Making Paper Dolls, supra note 105, at 47. In some circuits, the percent-
age of the docket devoted to immigration is even higher. "In fiscal year 2008, immigration
cases comprised 41 percent of the entire Second Circuit docket and 34 percent of the Ninth
Circuit docket." Legomsky, supra note 114, at 1647.
122. See, e.g., Benson, Making Paper Dolls, supra note 105, at 60 n.95 ("The rate or [sic]
remand or reversal in the Second Circuit is 20% and has reached as high as 40% in the
Seventh Circuit."). It is not clear whether the reversal rate has always been this high, or
whether the rate has been increasing. See Palmer, Challenging Board of Immigration Ap-
peals, supra note 108, at 50. Moreover, the Department of Justice has disputed that the
reversal numbers are this high and contends that the reversal rate is no higher than 10%.
Benson, You Can't Get There, supra note 120, at 424-25.
123. See OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS & TECH., U.S. D.O.J. FY 2010 STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK tbl. 2 (2011) (table listing the number of circuit court remands of BIA petitions
by year), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fylOsyb.pdf; FOIA Complaint,
supra note 28, 3 ("Each year, the federal courts may vacate or reverse more than 1,000
removal orders."); id. 20 ("Since 2005, the federal circuit courts alone have vacated or
reversed more than 7,000 removal orders."); Baldini-Potermin, supra note 119 (providing
the number of petitions for review granted each year from 2005 through 2008).
124. Legomsky, supra note 114, at 1653-54.
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that may be prone to reversal. 125 Wrongful deportations may also result
from confusion and uncertainty regarding the grounds for deportation
that the 1996 amendments and the subsequent REAL ID Act amend-
ments of 2005 created, which may lead to erroneous interpretations of the
law by immigration judges. 126
Indeed, appellate courts have not been shy about admonishing what
they perceive as the poor quality of decision making by immigration
judges and the BIA. 127 In Benslimane v. Gonzales, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit emphasized that the court's "criticisms of
the Board and of the immigration judges have frequently been severe"
and explained that as a result, "[i]n the year ending on the date of this
argument, different panels of this court reversed the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals in whole or in part in a staggering 40 percent of the 136
petitions to review the Board that were resolved on the merits."'128 Other
courts have made similar criticisms. 129
Many of the aliens who successfully obtain a reversal in the court of
125. A senior colleague of John T. Noonan, Jr., a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, once remarked that "[t]he INS [now DHS] is the only agency in
Washington that doesn't exercise discretion." John T. Noonan, Jr., Immigration Law 2006,
55 CAmH. U. L. REV. 905, 913 (2006).
126. Rosenbloom, Remedies for the Wrongly Deported, supra note 28, at 149-50 (noting
that the 1996 amendments contained numerous ambiguities and that government attorneys
"aggressively pursued broad interpretations of the new laws," which were later overturned
by appeals courts). In fact, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected attempts to inter-
pret the scope of deportable offenses expansively. See, e.g., Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder,
130 S. Ct. 2577, 2589-90 (2010) (rejecting the view that an alien's second drug conviction
for simple drug possession constituted an aggravated felony); Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S.
47, 67 (2006) (rejecting the view that a crime defined as a felony under state law automati-
cally qualifies as a felony for purposes of immigration law); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1,
3-4 (2004) (finding that conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol was not a
categorical crime of violence so as to render an alien deportable).
127. See, e.g., Christine B. LaBrie, Third Circuit Describes "Disturbing Pattern of IJ
Misconduct" in Asylum Cases, IMMIGRATION DAILY, http://www.ilw.com/articles/
2005,1027-labrie.shtm (last visited July 7, 2012) (describing the court's decision in Wang v.
Attorney Gen., 423 F.3d 260, 267 (3d Cir. 2005), in which the court stated: "Time and
again, we have cautioned immigration judges against making intemperate or humiliating
remarks during immigration proceedings. Three times this year we have had to admonish
immigration judges who failed to treat the asylum applicants in their court with the appro-
priate respect and consideration.").
128. Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005); see also id. at 830 (con-
cluding that "the adjudication of [immigration] cases at the administrative level has fallen
below the minimum standards of legal justice").
129. See, e.g., Zuh v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 504, 513-14 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting "that aca-
demic literature and court decisions have grown increasingly strident in their criticism of
the immigration review process" and expressing that its decision in granting an alien's peti-
tion for review "adds to this rising tide of criticism"); N'Diom v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 494,
500-01 (6th Cir. 2006) (Martin, J., concurring) ("There are no doubt many conscientious,
dedicated, and thorough immigration courts across the country. Unfortunately, their hard
work is overshadowed by the significantly increasing rate at which adjudication lacking in
reason, logic, and effort from other immigration courts is reaching the federal circuits.");
see also Baldini-Potermin, supra note 119 (providing additional examples). In 2006, then-
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales issued a memorandum to all immigration judges criti-
cizing them for failing to "produce the quality of work that I expect" from Justice Depart-
ment employees. Memorandum from Alberto Gonzales, U.S. Attorney Gen., to
Immigration Judges (Jan. 9, 2006), http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/ag-010906.pdf.
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appeals may have already been removed from the United States.1 30
Some aliens may file a petition for review but fail to seek a stay of re-
moval. Others may request a stay that the court ultimately denies. Still
others may be removed before they have a chance to seek a stay. By
statute, an alien has thirty days to file a petition for review, but in many
cases the government removes an individual before that thirty-day period
has passed. Because a motion for a stay is not a pro forma document in
that an alien must make a substantial showing of likelihood of success on
the merits and of irreparable injury, an alien may not be able to file a stay
application before being deported, especially if the alien has obtained
new counsel who needs to become familiar with the case.' 31 Finally,
some aliens may prefer removal while their petition is pending rather
than remain in the United States. Aliens who are detained while their
proceedings are ongoing may reasonably decide that rather than spending
a year or more in prison under difficult and often unsafe conditions while
their petitions are pending, they may stay safer and healthier if they are
deported.132 In short, a significant number of aliens who prevail in a peti-
tion for review and who overturn their deportation orders will do so after
having been deported.
Moreover, the number of aliens prevailing from abroad stands to in-
crease in coming years. In addition to petitions for review, another po-
tential avenue for challenging deportation orders is to file a motion to
130. See FOIA Complaint, supra note 28, 20 (noting that a "significant number" of
vacated removal orders "involve individuals challenging their removability from outside
the United States").
131. The government has the authority to remove an alien on the same day that the
removal order becomes final. Baldini-Potermin, supra note 119. A non-citizen cannot ob-
tain a stay "if he or she is removed from the U.S. before the noncitizen or his or her
counsel even receives the [BIA's] decision or has sufficient time to prepare the petition for
review and the emergency motion for a stay." Id.; accord Oral Argument at 2:30, Gracia-
Moncaleano v. Attorney Gen., 390 F. App'x 81 (3d Cir. 2010) (No. 08-3669), available at
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/08-3669Moncaleanov.AttyGenUSA.wma
(petitioner's counsel stated that petitioner was removed almost immediately after he was
retained and before he had a chance to review the petitioner's file); FOIA Complaint,
supra note 28, T 20 (citing Reyes-Torres v. Holder, 645 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2011), in which
the alien was deported seven days after the BIA's final decision and before the alien had
filed a petition for review, a motion to reopen, or a request for a stay of removal); see also
Coyt v. Holder, 593 F.3d 902, 904 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that the alien was deported while
his motion to reopen was still pending before the BIA); Madrigal v. Holder, 572 F.3d 239,
245 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that the petitioner was removed while her motion for stay of
removal was pending before the BIA). It is also possible that non-citizens, particularly
detained non-citizens, will be removed while their motion for a stay is in the mail to the
court of appeals. See Baldini-Potermin, supra note 119.
132. See Kalhan, supra note 45, at 43 ("For many non-citizens, detention now repre-
sents a deprivation as severe as removal itself."). In several cases, non-citizens have cho-
sen to leave the country rather than stay detained. See FOIA Complaint, supra note 28,
exhibit G $ 23 (Declaration of Joseph Hohenstein); Motion to Lift Temporary Stay of
Removal and to Withdraw Motion for Stay of Removal Pending Consideration of Petition
for Review $ 5, Banuelos-Ayon v. Holder, 611 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 07-71667)
(withdrawing a motion for stay of removal because the petitioner "is incarcerated ... and
given the choice between remaining incarcerated and returning to Mexico... [petitioner]
would prefer to return to Mexico").
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reopen with the BIA.1 33 Until recently, that option was not available for
aliens who had already been deported because, pursuant to federal regu-
lations, an alien's departure, voluntary or otherwise, deprives the BIA of
jurisdiction to consider a motion to reopen.134 While that regulation still
exists, a number of appeals courts in recent years have struck down the
regulation as an arbitrary and capricious exercise of agency authority. 135
As a result, a greater number of aliens may obtain post-deportation relief
now that many aliens can file motions to reopen with the BIA in addition
to petitions for review with the courts of appeals.
Finally, not only does the practice of relegating deported aliens to a
lesser status even after they overturn their deportation orders directly af-
fect a large number of aliens, but it is also emblematic of a larger problem
regarding how to best provide justice to aliens who prevail from abroad.
As the current FOIA litigation indicates, the lack of a clear government
policy for returning successful aliens means that even those who do not
fall within the inadmissibility gap face substantial difficulty returning to
the United States. In some cases, it has taken years after a victory for an
alien to return to the United States because federal agencies have dis-
claimed responsibility for facilitating aliens' return or have refused to is-
sue the necessary travel documents to permit return.1 36 Although these
aliens have no existing deportation order and therefore have a right to
return to the United States, agency intransigence places them in limbo
where they need authorization from the government to come back, but
where no branch of the government claims to have the power to provide
such authorization. An additional effect of treating returning aliens as
arriving aliens is that they are threatened with or placed in detention of
indefinite duration.137 Detention facilities for immigrants have been
widely criticized for overcrowding, inadequate sanitation, and physical
and emotional abuse, in addition to the hardships that detention places
on an immigrant's family.138 Furthermore, aliens who obtained release
from detention prior to their original removal by posting bond have
found themselves again placed in detention following their return, mean-
ing that the alien has to pay the same bond twice (if the alien can afford
133. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)-(7) (2006) (conferring a statutory right on aliens to file
one motion to reopen with the BIA).
134. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) (2011).
135. See Lin v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 681 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012); Contreras-Bo-
canegra v. Holder, 678 F.3d 811, 812 (10th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Prestol Espinal v. Attorney
Gen., 653 F.3d 213, 224 (3d Cir. 2011); Pruidze v. Holder, 632 F.3d 234, 237-38 (6th Cir.
2011); Reyes-Torres v. Holder, 645 F.3d 1073, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2011); Marin-Rodriguez v.
Holder, 612 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 2010); William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 334 (4th Cir.
2007); see also Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85, 102 (2d Cir. 2011) (declining to decide the
validity of the departure bar but stating that "the BIA must consider an alien's motion to
reopen even if the alien is no longer in the United States"). For a detailed explanation and
criticism of the departure bar, see Rosenbloom, Remedies for the Wrongly Deported, supra
note 28.
136. FOIA Complaint, supra note 28, 1[ 525-35.
137. Arriving aliens who are charged as inadmissible are subject to mandatory deten-
tion for the duration of their proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iv).
138. Kalhan, supra note 45, at 46-47.
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it) to obtain release. 139 None of these impediments would apply to aliens
who win their cases while still inside the United States.
Thus, this practice has already affected large numbers of aliens. As the
next two parts explain, the statute does not support the government's po-
sition, and even if it did, its position may violate both the Due Process
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
IV. STATUTORY CONCERNS
An analysis of the lawfulness of treating wrongly deported immigrants
as arriving aliens when they attempt to return to the United States re-
quires looking first to whether the practice is authorized by statute. Two
divergent views exist as to whether this reflects the intent of Congress.
One view is that it runs contrary to the purposes of the 1996 IIRIRA
amendments, which sought to expedite the removal of aliens and still al-
low deported aliens to fully vindicate their rights by eliminating both the
right to an automatic stay during a petition for review and the bar against
pursuing a petition for review from abroad.
The other view is that the authorization for the government's actions
comes straight from the text of the INA. The government has claimed in
prior cases that the text requires it to treat those aliens who have been
removed from the United States following the commission of a crime or
who have been outside the United States for more than six months as
"arriving aliens," regardless of the reason for their departure. Further,
under this view, an alien who cannot return after prevailing from abroad
has only himself to blame for not obtaining a stay of removal prior to
being deported.
This part carefully reviews each of these arguments. It concludes that
where the government has treated prevailing aliens as subject to inadmis-
sibility standards, it has undermined Congress's intent to allow aliens to
fully vindicate their rights from abroad. Finally, this part posits that the
government has erroneously relied upon textual sections not intended to
apply to involuntary deportations which are subsequently invalidated.
A. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
Subjecting aliens who win their appeals from abroad to inadmissibility
standards rather than deportability standards is inconsistent with congres-
sional intent in several ways and therefore likely contravenes the INA.
First, such a practice encourages aliens to seek stays of removal, which is
exactly what Congress was trying to discourage in the 1996 amendments.
Treating aliens who prevail from abroad as subject to inadmissibility stan-
dards as opposed to the deportability standards under which they were
originally charged will substantially delay, rather than expedite, the re-
moval of aliens. If aliens who prevail in their petitions for review follow-
ing removal find that they have been demoted to a lesser status and are
139. FOIA Complaint, supra note 28, exhibit G 14.
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now subject to inadmissibility grounds, every alien will have the incentive
to seek a stay of removal to avoid being prejudiced by a pre-appeal re-
moval and the subsequent application of the more stringent inadmissibil-
ity grounds upon reentry. Those aliens who cannot return if they prevail
will have stronger grounds for obtaining a stay of removal because they
will be able to show irreparable injury from deportation. Thus, under the
government's practice, the statute effectively reverts to its pre-IIRIRA
structure for aliens subject to the inadmissibility gap.
Additionally, because the fact of deportation renders this class of aliens
inadmissible even if an appeals court overturns their deportation orders,
deportation operates as a functional withdrawal of the alien's petition for
review. Such a situation would thwart IIRIRA's goal of expediting re-
moval by limiting stays of removal and granting aliens the ability to pur-
sue judicial review from abroad.
Second, subjecting prevailing aliens to inadmissibility standards rather
than deportability standards undermines the goal of increasing accuracy.
If the fact of removal can prevent a successful alien from returning to the
United States by subjecting that alien to more stringent inadmissibility
standards, then the government has little incentive to ensure that its alle-
gations of deportability are correct. If the government knows that there
is a good chance the alien will not be able to reenter even if the alien
wins, then the government gets the result it sought even if it lacked legiti-
mate grounds for deporting the individual in the first place. For the alien,
winning on appeal becomes a hollow victory. An alien who is improperly
removed and finds himself inadmissible as a direct consequence of the
improper removal will receive no meaningful relief and will suffer the
same fate as if the improper order were never corrected. The only way to
maintain consistency with IIRIRA and to promote accuracy is to restore
the alien to the precise status the alien possessed prior to removal, which
includes being lawfully present inside the United States and subject to
deportability grounds rather than inadmissibility grounds.
Third, subjecting prevailing aliens to inadmissibility standards under-
cuts their statutory right to judicial review of deportation orders. Al-
though the effect of the government's practice on an alien's ability to
obtain meaningful judicial review implicates due process concerns as dis-
cussed in Part V.A.,140 it also reinforces how the practice is inconsistent
with the INA's statutory scheme. The INA provides a statutory right to
seek review of a final deportation order.141 The Supreme Court has pre-
viously refused to interpret the INA in a way that would limit an alien's
statutory right to obtain review of deportation orders. In Dada v.
Mukasey, 142 the Court addressed the interplay of an INA provision al-
lowing for "voluntary departure" within sixty days of a removal order, an
INA provision allowing aliens to file a motion to reopen with the BIA,
140. See infra Part V.A.
141. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).
142. 554 U.S. 1 (2008).
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and a regulation barring aliens from pursuing their motion to reopen fol-
lowing removal.143 The crux of the conflict was that an alien who is
granted voluntary departure must depart within sixty days or face certain
penalties, while a motion to reopen often takes longer than sixty days to
decide. This meant that an alien who elected to voluntarily depart effec-
tively gave up the right to pursue a motion to reopen, while an alien who
refused to voluntarily depart in order to pursue the motion to reopen
suffered other adverse consequences. 44 The Court rejected the govern-
ment's proffered interpretation that an alien who seeks voluntary depar-
ture gives up the right to pursue a motion to reopen and held that at a
minimum, the alien must be permitted to withdraw the request for volun-
tary departure so that he or she does not suffer penalties for pursuing the
motion to reopen.145 Although the Court acknowledged that some statu-
tory language supported the government's position,1 46 it nonetheless
found the government's view "unsustainable" because "[i]t would render
the statutory right to seek reopening a nullity in most cases of voluntary
departure. '147 Additionally, it found that the purpose of providing re-
view through a motion to reopen was "to ensure a proper and lawful
disposition" of immigration charges and determined that Congress would
not have intended to eliminate the "important safeguard" of a motion to
reopen for a large class of aliens. 148
The situation regarding aliens who overturn their deportation orders
following removal is very similar. The INA expressly authorizes aliens to
seek judicial review of final deportation orders by filing a petition for
review in the court of appeals,149 and in fact makes petitions for review
the "sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of re-
moval."' 50 The statute provides several restrictions on the right to judi-
cial review, including prohibiting review of rulings regarding
discretionary relief, yet contains no provision restricting relief based on
whether or not the alien has been removed.' 51
143. Id. at 5.
144. Id. ("[A]n alien who seeks reopening has two poor choices: The alien can remain
in the United States to ensure the motion to reopen remains pending, while incurring stat-
utory penalties for overstaying the voluntary departure date; or the alien can avoid penal-
ties by prompt departure but abandon the motion to reopen.").
145. Id. at 15-19.
146. Id. at 15 (noting that the sixty-day requirement of the voluntary departure provi-
sion "contains no ambiguity"). Indeed, the dissenting Justices argued persuasively in dis-
sent that the statutory language regarding voluntary departure is mandatory and does not
authorize an alien to withdraw in order to avoid statutory penalties. See id. at 23-30
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 16.
148. Id. at 18.
149. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (2006).
150. Id. § 1252(a)(5).
151. See id. § 1252(a)(2)-(3). See also id. § 1252(e) (limiting the type of relief a court
may order in a petition for review). Although the statute bars aliens convicted of certain
criminal offenses, including aggravated felonies, from seeking judicial review, the statue
explicitly authorizes courts to address questions of law regarding whether the alien's crimi-
nal conviction qualifies as one that would deprive the court of jurisdiction to review the
case. See id. § 1252(a)(2)(D) ("Nothing in subparagraph (B) or (C), or in any other provi-
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If an alien's deportation acts to bar the alien from reentering, even
after the deportation order is overturned, then the alien's statutory right
to judicial review of the deportation order is nullified. 152 Just as the
Court in Dada determined that Congress likely did not intend to remove
the availability of judicial review for large classes of aliens, it is similarly
unlikely that Congress intended for a deportation order, once it has been
vacated, to continue to live by taking away the alien's right to reenter the
United States.
There is no question that if the alien were never removed in the first
place, the alien would be subject to the statute's deportability standards,
and the inadmissibility standards never would come into play. The situa-
tion should not change simply because an alien prevails after deportation
rather than before it. The government should not be able to deport an
alien, and then after the deportation order was found to be improper, use
the fact of deportation to subject the alien to new inadmissibility grounds
that did not apply previously. Doing so runs directly contrary to
IIRIRA's purposes of enabling aliens to seek judicial review from abroad
and limiting an alien's right to a stay of removal.
B. THE STATUTORY TEXT
Although IIRIRA's purposes support allowing aliens who prevail from
abroad to reenter the United States and to continue to be subject to de-
portability standards instead of being newly subject to inadmissibility
standards, various sections of the statutory text appear at first blush to
support the contrary position that such aliens should be required to apply
for admission in order to return to the United States. As explained be-
low, however, it is unlikely that Congress contemplated applying these
provisions to an alien who is involuntarily removed pursuant to a depor-
tation order that is subsequently vacated, and to do so would run afoul of
the principle requiring courts to avoid interpretations of statutes that lead
to absurd results. 153
sion of this chapter (other than this section) which limits or eliminates judicial review, shall
be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon
a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this
section.").
152. To be sure, overturning a deportation order may bring an alien some ancillary
benefits that are not nullified by treating the alien as inadmissible. For example, an alien
who succeeds in vacating a removal order by showing that his criminal conviction is not an
aggravated felony will no longer be subject to the rule that a previously deported alien
cannot seek reentry for a specified number of years, depending on the ground for deporta-
tion. See id. § 1182(a)(9) (listing the various bars on reentry following deportation). How-
ever, these small benefits pale in comparison to the benefit of establishing that the alien is
not deportable in the first place, which is likely the primary reason why aliens file petitions
for review.
153. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.05,
at 103, § 46.06, at 119, § 46.07, at 126 (5th. ed. 1992). See also United States v. Wilson, 503
U.S. 329, 334 (1992) ("[A]bsurd results are to be avoided.").
[Vol. 65
Illegal Emigration
1. Aliens Who Have Been Absent for More than 180 Days or Who
Have Committed an Inadmissible Offense
One textual argument is that the statutory definition of admission re-
quires an alien who wins a petition for review while abroad to submit a
new application for admission in order to reenter. 154 The statutory defini-
tion of admission generally permits lawful permanent residents to leave
and reenter the United States without having to reapply for admission
each time.15s However, the statute contains several exceptions. Of partic-
ular relevance here, a returning lawful permanent resident will be re-
quired to seek a new admission if he or she "has been absent from the
United States for a continuous period in excess of 180 days,"'156 or has
previously "committed an offense" that would make the resident inad-
missible and has not been granted a waiver for that offense. 157 Relying
on these exceptions, the government has argued that an alien whose peti-
tion for review took more than two years to reach a decision was restored
to LPR status when he won his petition but that he still "was an applicant
for admission" because he stayed outside of the United States for more
than 180 days.158
These statutory provisions, however, should not apply to involuntary
removals that result from subsequently invalidated deportation orders.
The 180-day provision was Congress's replacement for the so-called Fleuti
doctrine, which was a judicial doctrine establishing that aliens who volun-
tarily leave the United States for brief, casual trips do not have to reapply
for admission upon return.159 Congress's creation of a 180-day period to
replace the Fleuti doctrine reflected its view that an alien who takes a trip
of more than 180 days is not sufficiently committed to the United States
to retain lawful permanent resident status. However, Congress's concern
about an alien's dedication to the United States does not arise in the situ-
ation where an alien is involuntarily removed and attempts to preserve
his ability to remain in the United States by challenging the validity of his
deportation order. 160 If the 180-day absence is taken literally, then an
154. The government has made this argument in litigation before. See DHS Memoran-
dum, supra note 98, at 5.
155. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C) (stating that "[a]n alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence in the United States shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into the
United States for purposes of the immigration laws" unless a specific exception applies).
156. Id. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(ii).
157. Id. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v).
158. DHS Memorandum, supra note 98, at 5 ("[T]he respondent was outside the
United States for more than 180 days, as [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)C)](ii) above provides.
Thus ... he was an applicant for admission .... ).
159. See Rosenberg v. Flueti, 374 U.S. 449, 461 (1963); see generally Michael S. Satow,
A Journey Through the Fog: Due Process Analysis of LN.A. Section 242(a)(2), 5 GEO.
IMMGR. L.J., 677, 683-84 (1991).
160. In analogous circumstances, the Sixth Circuit held that the government's physical
removal of an alien from the United States does not constitute an abandonment of the
alien's motion to reopen. See Madrigal v. Holder, 572 F.3d 239, 245 (6th Cir. 2009) ("Un-
like the cases in which the petitioner either deliberately or inadvertently left the United
States, it cannot be said that Madrigal relinquished or abandoned the right to appeal by
virtue of her own conduct. Instead, her departure was forced by the government during
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alien's ability to retain lawful permanent resident status depends not on
any behavior by the alien, but simply on the happenstance of whether the
court of appeals takes more than 180 days to rule on a petition for review.
Given that the average time from the filing of an appeal to final disposi-
tion by the court of appeals is at least eleven months, 161 virtually every
LPR who is involuntarily removed and later wins a petition for review
will have to seek readmission, even though the alien never would have
left the United States but for the vacated removal order.
Viewing the statute as a whole also supports the conclusion that Con-
gress did not intend to allow the government to rely on a subsequently
vacated deportation order to render an alien inadmissible. For example,
the statute's inadmissibility provisions provide that any alien previously
removed is inadmissible and may not reenter without first obtaining per-
mission from the Attorney General. 62 If applied literally, then no alien
ordered deported would be allowed to return unless the Attorney Gen-
eral, in its discretion, permits the alien to reenter. The Attorney Gen-
eral's discretion to deny permission to reenter is quite broad and
reviewable only under a "very high standard of arbitrariness.' 1 63 The
statute also allows the Attorney General to deny permission to reenter
for reasons other than whether the alien has committed a deportable or
inadmissible offense. 164 Applying this provision would subject aliens who
successfully overturn their deportation orders to exactly the same con-
straints as aliens whose deportation orders remain valid. There is no evi-
dence that Congress intended for this provision to apply to aliens whose
removal orders have been overturned. Rather, it is more likely that the
provision applies only to aliens with existing removal orders, which is re-
flected in judicial decisions holding that a ruling vacating a deportation
the pendency of her appeal, and hence, she did not take any action, either purposeful or
unwitting, that can be construed as a waiver of her right to contest the immigration judge's
decision.").
161. See Federal Court Management Statistics, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS
(Sept. 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalCourt
ManagementStatistics/2011/Appeals% 20FCMS % 2OProfiles % 2OSeptember % 202011.pdf&
page=1. It is not uncommon for a petition for review to take more than two years from the
filing of the petition to the issuance of a final decision. See, e.g., Valdiviezo-Galdamez v.
Attorney Gen., 663 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 2011) (petition filed Nov. 19, 2008 and final decision
issued Nov. 8, 2011); Gracia-Moncaleano v. Attorney Gen., 390 F. App'x 81 (3d Cir. 2010)
(petition filed Aug. 28, 2008 and final decision issued August 13, 2010); Banuelos-Ayon v.
Holder, 611 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2010) (petition filed Apr. 30, 2007 and final decision issued
July 14, 2010). The Ninth Circuit has a sufficient backlog that its local rules discourage
attorneys from contacting the clerk's office regarding when the court will schedule oral
argument, let alone decide the case, until fifteen months have passed since the completion
of briefing. See 9TH CIR. R. 25-2 advisory committee's note (advising counsel that they
may contact the court regarding possible delays if "the parties have not received notice of
oral argument or submission on the briefs within 15 months after the completion of
briefing").
162. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9).
163. 5 CHARLES GoRDoN ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAw & PROCEDURE § 63.10 [4][b], at
63-128 (2000).




order removes this particular bar on reentry.165 Nonetheless, at least one
immigration judge relied on this section to find that an alien who won his
petition for review while abroad was inadmissible unless the alien first
obtained permission to reenter from the Attorney General. 166
Moreover, refusing to apply the statutory language to involuntary re-
movals is consistent with how courts have drawn distinctions between
aliens who leave voluntarily and those who are involuntarily removed
when interpreting other portions of the INA, even when the text of those
provisions draws no distinction between voluntary and involuntary re-
moval. For example, the INA provides that aliens who apply to natural-
ize as United States citizens must demonstrate continuous residence in
the United States for the five years immediately preceding the date of
application and also provides that an absence of one year or longer dur-
ing that time will break the alien's period of continuous residence.167
Both the courts and the executive branch, however, have interpreted that
provision to mean that only voluntary absences from the United States
break the alien's period of continuous residence. 168
Similarly, at least two courts have refused to apply the plain language
of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.4, which bars an alien from pursuing a motion to reo-
pen from outside the United States, to an alien who was involuntarily
removed, even though the regulation draws no distinction between volun-
165. See, e.g., Contreras-Bocanegra v. Holder, 678 F.3d 811, 818-19 (10th Cir. 2012)
("When the Board grants a motion to reopen, this action vacates the underlying removal
order and restores the noncitizen to her prior status. As a result, the noncitizen is no
longer subject to the reentry bar under § 1182(a)(9)(A)." (citation omitted)); Swaby v.
Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2004) ("The government claims that petitioner would
still be inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii) [§ 212(a)(9)(A)(ii)] for having been
ordered removed after an aggravated felony conviction. This provision, however, would
not bar petitioner's reentry if we were to, as petitioner requests, grant a writ of habeas
corpus and vacate his order of removal.").
Chong v. Dist. Dir., 264 F.3d 378, 384-85 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding that the "reentry bar" of 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) would not apply if the alien succeeded in vacating his deportation
order).
166. G-G-M- Interlocutory Order, supra note 80, at 5.
167. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)-(b).
168. See In re Yarina, 73 F. Supp. 688, 689 (N.D. Ohio 1947) ("It is evident that the
statute which deprives a petitioner of naturalization and the right to citizenship contem-
plates a voluntary departure from the United States and a subsequent absence for a dura-
tion of more than one year within the period of required continuous residence."); id.
("Absence from the United States manifestly means absence voluntarily initiated."). Al-
though the involuntary absence in Yarina was not caused by deportation (the petitioner
was working abroad on an island that was attacked by Japanese forces during World War II
and became a captive prisoner of war), the executive branch, in its interpretation of the
naturalization provision, has not drawn any distinctions between different types of involun-
tary absences. Instead, it has stated that when "departure from the United States is invol-
untary and the absence which follows is enforced against the alien, he is considered as
never having left the United States, within the purview of the statute, and as never having
interrupted continuous residence in the United States. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION





tary and involuntary removals. 169 In both cases, the courts found that
interpreting the regulation literally would lead to unreasonable results
that were inconsistent with Congress's decision to provide a statutory
right of review of deportation decisions.170
Consequently, while the text of the INA provides that a prior criminal
conviction or a prolonged absence of more than 180 days can require an
alien to reapply for admission, restricting that text to voluntary absences
is the best way to maintain consistency with congressional intent and pro-
mote fairness. To hold otherwise risks punishing an alien for the govern-
ment's error in removing the alien in the first place, especially when the
alien has actively asserted his or her right to remain in the United States.
2. Aliens Who Fail to Obtain a Stay of Removal
A second textual argument is that an alien who wins a petition for re-
view while abroad should not be able to avoid the statute's inadmissibility
standards if the alien failed to seek or obtain a stay of removal as author-
ized by statute.17' Under this view, an alien who wishes to remain subject
to deportability standards should obtain a stay of removal, and any alien
who does not obtain a statutorily-authorized stay can point only to his or
her own negligence in complaining about being subject to inadmissibility
standards. 172 This argument is flawed 'for several reasons.
First, requiring aliens to seek a stay of removal in order to remain sub-
ject to deportability standards creates the very incentives to pursue stays
of removal that Congress sought to eliminate when it enacted IIRIRA.173
Second, even if an alien seeks a stay, there is no guarantee that the alien
would receive one. Stays of removal are not automatic.174 The standard
169. See Coyt v. Holder, 593 F.3d 902, 907 (9th Cir. 2010); Madrigal v. Holder, 572 F.3d
239, 244-45 (6th Cir. 2009). See also Long v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 516, 520 (5th Cir. 2005)
(explaining that the regulation contains no exception for involuntary departures).
170. Coyt, 593 F.3d at 907 ("It would completely eviscerate the statutory right to reo-
pen provided by Congress if the agency deems a motion to reopen constructively with-
drawn whenever the government physically removes the petitioner while his motion is
pending before the BIA."); Madrigal, 572 F.3d at 245 ("To allow the government to cut off
Madrigal's statutory right to appeal an adverse decision, in this manner, simply by remov-
ing her before a stay can be issued or a ruling on the merits can be obtained, strikes us as a
perversion of the administrative process."). Cf Long, 420 F.3d at 520 & n.6 (declining to
address whether an involuntary removal would constitute abandonment of a motion to
reopen and finding that an alien abandoned his motion by accidentally crossing the border
into Mexico). For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see generally Marianna C. Man-
cusi-Ungaro, Comment, Defining "Departure" in the Context of 8 CFR § 1003.4, 76 U. CHI.
L. REV. 467 (2009).
171. The INA permits a court to order a stay of removal while a petition for review is
pending. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B) (stating that filing a petition for review "does not stay
the removal of an alien pending the court's decision on the petition, unless the court orders
otherwise").
172. In re G-G-M-, Master Calendar Hearing, (Sept. 1, 2011).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38. See also Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418,
435 (2009) ("Congress's decision in IIRIRA to allow continued prosecution of a petition
after removal eliminated the reason for categorical stays, as reflected in the repeal of the
automatic stay [provision] ... ").
174. Nken, 556 U.S. at 433 ("A stay is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury
might otherwise result." (citation and quotation omitted)).
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for obtaining a stay is not easily satisfied.1 75 If a court denies an alien's
request for stay, then the alien will be deported pending the outcome of
the petition and will still face the same impediments to reentry as an alien
who did not request a stay. Third, requiring an alien to seek or obtain a
stay overlooks the fact that aliens may be deported before they have a
chance to put together a motion for a stay, before the motion is ruled
upon, or before they even receive notice of the decision finding them
deportable. An alien can be removed in a matter of days following a final
deportation order, and in that time, the alien may be attempting to obtain
counsel to file a stay or attempting to file one pro se. Even if an alien can
retain counsel, deportation may occur before counsel can obtain the doc-
uments necessary to put together a motion, especially since the govern-
ment has an incentive to deport aliens quickly in order save money on
detention costs. 176 Fourth, an alien may understandably prefer to return
to his or her home country-which is what the 1996 amendments explic-
itly authorize-rather than remain incarcerated indefinitely in adminis-
trative detention under difficult conditions as the alien's petition for
review winds its way through the court system. Thus, determining which
substantive standards apply to an alien based on whether the alien ob-
tained a stay of removal does not support Congress's goals of expediting
removal and promoting accuracy in removal decisions.
In short, although the language of certain portions of the INA and the
availability of discretionary stays of removal may lend support to the gov-
ernment's practice of treating those aliens who seek to return after over-
turning their deportation orders from abroad as arriving aliens, both the
statute's overall structure and the judiciary's reluctance to apply the INA
literally to involuntary removals suggest that the INA does not compel
the government's practice but instead prohibits it. If a non-citizen hap-
pens to be outside the United States solely because of a deportation or-
der that is subsequently held unlawful, the non-citizen should not find
that the fact of his removal has erected a new and previously inapplicable
barrier to residing inside the United States.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
Even if the INA did require subjecting aliens who prevail from abroad
to inadmissibility standards rather than deportability standards, such a
practice would still be unlawful if it violated the Constitution. Subjecting
175. Id. at 1762 ("A court asked to stay removal cannot simply assume that ordinarily,
the balance of hardships will weigh heavily in the applicant's favor." (citation and quota-
tion omitted)); accord Baldini-Potermin, supra note 119, at 4 ("The standard for a motion
for a stay of removal is high and not the type of motion that counsel can generate in 20 or
30 minutes.").
176. See supra notes 130-131 and accompanying text. Some circuits bypass this prob-
lem by allowing an alien to file a bare bones motion for a stay of removal and automati-
cally granting a temporary stay until the court can address the substantive grounds for the




prevailing aliens to inadmissibility standards raises serious constitutional
concerns under both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause. With respect to due process, even if the Constitution does not
categorically guarantee aliens a right to seek judicial review of deporta-
tion orders, applying the procedural due process balancing test laid out
by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge177 would likely render the
government's practice invalid.178 With respect to equal protection, it may
be difficult for the government to articulate any rational basis for apply-
ing different substantive standards based solely on whether the alien hap-
pens to succeed in overturning a deportation order while outside the
United States rather than inside the United States.
A. DUE PROCESS
A rule that permits the government to use the fact of deportation, even
after the deportation order has been vacated, to bar an alien from re-
turning to the United States risks violating due process in two different
ways. First, due process protects against the imposition of arbitrary pro-
cedures, and changing the governing legal standards in the middle of the
case is exactly that. Second, the rule potentially violates due process by
substantially restricting an alien's right to judicial review of a deportation
order.
The level of due process protection afforded to aliens is not uniform.
Aliens who have been present in the United States are entitled to some
level of due process protection while aliens who are seeking to enter the
United States for the first time receive no due process guarantees. 179
LPRs, including those who are returning from abroad, receive the great-
est due process protections, which include the right to a fair hearing
before they can be deported or barred from reentering.180
The first due process problem posed by changing the applicable legal
standards from deportability to inadmissibility for aliens who succeed
from abroad is that doing so arbitrarily changes the rules in the middle of
the game. The hallmark of due process is "protection of the individual
against arbitrary action of government.' 18 ' One aspect of procedural
fairness is the expectation that the relevant rules for deciding a case
should not change after the case begins. 182 In particular, the rules should
177. 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976).
178. The Mathews v. Eldridge framework applies to immigration proceedings. See Lan-
don v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34-37 (1982).
179. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001); accord Rosenbloom, Remedies for the
Wrongly Deported, supra note 28, at 165-66.
180. See Landon, 459 U.S. at 32; accord In re Huang, 19 I. & N. Dec. 749, 754 (B.I.A.
1988) (holding that "[f]or purposes of the constitutional right to due process, a returning
lawful permanent resident's status is assimilated to that of an alien continuously residing
and physically present in the United States").
181. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974).
182. See, e.g., Charles E. Rounds, Jr., Proponents of Extracting Slavery Reparations
from Private Interests Must Contend with Equity's Maxims, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 673, 691
(2011) ("The Anglo-American legal tradition does not take kindly to changing the rules in
[Vol. 65
Illegal Emigration
not change by virtue of an action by the government-in this case depor-
tation-that is ultimately determined to be improper. Sanctioning the
government's attempt to change the relevant standards governing an
alien's challenge from deportability standards to inadmissibility stan-
dards, and basing the change on the government's own error, is arbitrary
and unwarranted. If deportation standards apply to an alien's case when
it is first initiated, then those standards should apply throughout the re-
mainder of the proceeding. The government should not be able to take
advantage of its own error to apply new rules while the case is still
ongoing.
To be sure, reclassifying an alien as an arriving alien might be justified
when it is based on the alien's own conduct, such as when an alien com-
mits a crime or is absent from the United States for an extended period of
time.183 But the circumstances are different when an alien is forced to
leave even while pursuing all available avenues for relief. Consequently,
courts have recognized that limiting an alien's ability to challenge a re-
moval decision as a result of an involuntary removal that the alien was
actively protesting violates principles of fundamental fairness and consti-
tutes a "perversion of the administrative process. 1 84
Second, subjecting prevailing aliens to inadmissibility standards risks
violating due process by taking away an alien's right to meaningful judi-
cial review of a deportation order. The Constitution does not explicitly
guarantee a right to judicial review of all administrative agency decisions.
Because aliens do not have a constitutional right to an appeal, either ad-
ministrative or judicial, it is not clear that limiting judicial review would
automatically violate due process.1 85 However, once a statute provides a
the middle of the game .... "); cf Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141, 146 (2d
Cir. 1992) (vacating arbitration award where the arbitration tribunal imposed a new evi-
dentiary requirement in the middle of the proceeding).
183. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(ii) (2006) (stating that a lawful permanent resident
will be reclassified as an applicant for admission if the resident "has been absent from the
United States for a continuous period in excess of 180 days").
184. See, e.g., Madrigal v. Holder, 572 F.3d 239, 245 (6th Cir. 2009) (rejecting a rule
under which an alien's involuntary removal would take away the alien's ability to file a
motion to reopen the adverse ruling as violating principles of fundamental fairness).
185. It remains an unsettled question whether the Constitution requires judicial review
of a deportation order. On one hand, several courts have held that aliens do not have a
constitutional right to an appeal from an administrative decision. See, e.g., Blanco de Bel-
bruno v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 272, 280 (4th Cir. 2004) ("An alien has no constitutional right
to any administrative appeal at all.") (quoting Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365, 376 (1st Cir.
2003); Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 242 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Benson, Making Paper
Dolls, supra note 104, at 60 & n.96 ("Under current case law, due process may not require
review by an Article III court."). At the same time, courts have expressed discomfort with
the notion that aliens might not be able to receive any judicial review of deportation deci-
sions. See, e.g., Kolster v. INS, 101 F.3d 785, 790 (1st Cir. 1996) (characterizing the ques-
tion of whether Congress could preclude judicial review of final removal orders as
"thorny"); Nancy Morawetz, Back to Back to the Future? Lessons Learned from Litigation
over the 1996 Restrictions on Judicial Review, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 113, 120 (2006-2007)
(emphasizing that several courts have expressed concerns that "elimination of all review
[of deportation orders] would raise serious constitutional issues"); see also Lenni B. Ben-
son, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of Immigration Pro-
ceedings, 29 CONN. L. REv. 1411, 1414 (1997) (noting the debate over whether due process
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right to judicial review, as the INA does, due process prohibits the gov-
ernment from arbitrarily taking away that right.186
Even if limiting judicial review does not necessarily violate due process
in all contexts, it likely does in this context. Due process requires that an
individual receive the opportunity to be heard "in a meaningful man-
ner." 187 Aliens facing deportation have a right to a fair hearing, and the
three-part balancing test laid out in Matthews v. Eldridge governs
whether the hearing meets the constitutional minimum for fairness.1 88
Under that test, courts assessing the fairness of certain procedures con-
sider: (1) the strength of the interest of the individual who is affected by
the government action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that
interest through the procedures used along with the probable value of
additional procedures; and (3) the burdens to the government of different
or additional procedures. 189
It seems likely that under this test, applying inadmissibility standards to
aliens who prevail on a petition for review would fall short of these mini-
mum constitutional safeguards. 190 With respect to the first factor, there is
requires some degree of judicial review of government action). In addressing judicial juris-
diction over deportation questions, the Supreme Court has emphasized "the strong pre-
sumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action." INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289,
298 (2001). At least with respect to deportation orders that traditionally could have been
challenged through habeas corpus proceedings, the Court has found that "some judicial
intervention in deportation cases is unquestionably required by the Constitution." Id. at
300 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, Congress amended
IIRIRA's judicial review provisions in the REAL ID Act of 2005 to make clear that courts
retained jurisdiction to review legal and constitutional questions relating to an order of
deportation. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 106, 119 Stat. 231 (2005). Part
of the motivation for the changes appears to have been the view that, following St. Cyr,
judicial review of deportation orders may be constitutionally required. See H.R. REP. No.
109-72, at 175 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 240, 299 (stating that the REAL ID
Act would "give every alien one day in the court of appeals, satisfying constitutional con-
cerns"); Gerald L. Neuman, On the Adequacy of Direct Review After the REAL ID Act of
2005, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 133, 138-39 (2006-2007) (describing the legislative history of
the REAL ID Act).
186. The maxim of ubi jus ibi remedium provides that where there is a right, there must
also be a meaningful remedy. See Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1916).
In the due process context, that means the right to a fair hearing also includes "the right to
effective redress." Catanzano ex rel. Catanzano v. Wing, 103 F.3d 223, 229 (2d Cir. 1996).
187. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) ("The fundamental requirement
of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
188. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34-35 (1982) (applying the Mathews test to im-
migration proceedings).
189. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
190. When the Justice Department issued its streamlining regulations in 2002, it ques-
tioned whether the Mathews test should apply to immigration proceedings given Con-
gress's unusually broad authority to regulate immigration and "the unique nature of the
[INA] as the tool for managing the intersection of foreign and domestic [policy] interests
regarding aliens." Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,882 (Aug. 26, 2002) codified at 8 C.F.R. pt.3. It is not
clear whether the Justice Department continues to adhere to that view. While it does not
appear that the government's broad powers require dispensing with the Mathews test as
applied to immigration, the scope of the government's authority over immigration matters
may be relevant to determining what procedures are considered fair under that test. Cf
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) ("In the exercise of its broad power over
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no question that the alien's interest in avoiding deportation, which often
means permanent separation from family and uprooting of one's liveli-
hood, is significant. 19t Thus, courts have determined that "the private
liberty interests involved in deportation proceedings are among the most
substantial" from a due process perspective. 192
The second factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation, also favors the
alien. The issue of which grounds-deportability or inadmissibility-
should apply arises only if the alien prevails in showing that the original
deportation order was incorrect. In that sense, the risk of erroneous dep-
rivation is not just a risk-it is a certainty. While not every alien who
prevails from abroad will fall within the inadmissibility gap and so not
every alien will end up unable to return, a substantial number will likely
be barred from returning given the various differences in the inadmissi-
bility and deportability grounds. Those aliens will suffer an erroneous
deprivation when they prevail on their petitions for review.
Third, the burden on the government is minimal. Rectifying the
problems that the inadmissibility gap creates does not require the imposi-
tion of additional costly layers of procedure or the creation of new legal
standards. Rather, all that is required is to continue to apply the same
deportability standards that the government applied the first time around
when the alien was still inside the United States. Given that the de-
portability standards were already applied once, it is hard to see what
burden results from applying them again. If anything, it seems easier and
less cumbersome for the government to continue prosecuting its original
Notice to Appear rather than issuing a new Notice to Appear that asserts
new inadmissibility-based charges.
Thus, the Mathews factors strongly suggest that allowing the govern-
ment to use a vacated removal order as a ground for preventing an alien
from reentering the United States when that order was the only reason
that the alien left in the first place would violate an alien's due process
right to a meaningful review of a deportation order. To be sure, such
aliens are not being denied judicial review in a formalistic sense. They
have the right to file and litigate a petition for review in the federal courts
of appeal, and winning that petition may even bring them some benefit by
making certain statutory bars on reentering after deportation inapplica-
ble. 193 However, that right to judicial review is not meaningful if an alien
can overturn his deportation order through a petition for review and still
be barred from returning based on the fact that he was deported pursuant
naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unaccept-
able if applied to citizens.").
191. See supra text accompanying notes 98-100.
192. Padilla-Agustin v. INS, 21 F.3d 970, 974-75 (9th Cir. 1994); accord Bridges v.
Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945) ("[Dleportation may result in the loss of all that makes life
worth living." (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Landon, 459 U.S. at 34 (stating
that a deported alien "lose[s] the right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom" as
well as the right to "rejoin her immediate family, a right that ranks high among the inter-
ests of the individual" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
193. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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to the now vacated order. In light of the high stakes for aliens facing
deportation, the fact that the issue only arises after the government erred
in finding the alien deportable, and the minimal burden on the govern-
ment of continuing to apply deportability standards to aliens who prevail
from abroad, aliens have strong constitutional grounds for challenging
the government's practice.
B. EQUAL PROTECTION
In addition to violating due process, subjecting aliens to inadmissibility
standards likely violates an alien's Fifth Amendment right to equal pro-
tection by treating aliens who win their cases while abroad differently
from those who win their cases while inside the United States.194 Admit-
tedly, among the arguments against the government's practice, the equal
protection argument likely is the weakest. Aliens are not a suspect class
and therefore the government's practice would be subject to the highly
deferential rational basis review. Despite the difficulty of having govern-
ment action declared unconstitutional under rational basis review, there
are credible arguments that distinguishing between aliens who win their
appeals while within the United States from those who win while abroad
lacks a legitimate justification.
The Equal Protection Clause protects non-citizens as well as citizens. 195
Specifically, equal protection guarantees apply in deportation proceed-
ings.196 Because aliens are not a suspect class and Congress possesses
broad power to regulate immigration, classifications in immigration mat-
ters are acceptable as long as they satisfy rational basis review.197 Ra-
tional basis review is a "minimal" standard of review, which will be
satisfied as long as the government can articulate some non-arbitrary rea-
son that Congress would create the distinction subject to challenge,
"whether such a reason was articulated by Congress or not." 198
A related route for challenging the government's practice is to seek to
invalidate it under administrative law principles. Under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, executive branch action will be set aside if it is "arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law."199 While arbitrary and capricious review is narrow,200 the
194. The Equal Protection principles of the Fourteenth Amendment also bind the fed-
eral government under the Fifth Amendment. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499
(1954).
195. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
196. See, e.g., Po Shing Yeung v. INS, 76 F.3d 337, 338-39 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding
equal protection violation where an alien in deportation proceedings was denied the right
to seek adjustment of status); Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 269 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding equal
protection violation where aliens who left the United States prior to removal, proceedings
could seek relief from removal but those who never left could not).
197. See, e.g., Po Shing Yeung, 76 F.3d at 339.
198. Arca-Pineda v. Attorney Gen., 527 F.3d 101, 105-06 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting
DeSousa v. Reno, 190 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 1999)).
199. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). This standard applies to executive branch conduct
regarding immigration. See, e.g., Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 479 (2011).
200. Id. at 483.
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agency must have a rational basis and provide a reasoned explanation for
a court to uphold its conduct. 201 As with the equal protection analysis,
agency action will be invalidated when it lacks a rational basis. The pri-
mary advantage of an arbitrary and capricious challenge is that unlike an
equal protection challenge, which will be upheld even if the court can
supply a hypothetical rationale for government action, review is limited
to the actual rationale articulated by the agency. 202 Thus, all the reasons
that follow suggesting the government's actions violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause also support an argument that the government's conduct is
arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.
A practice of subjecting aliens who prevail while abroad to inadmissi-
bility standards creates two classes of aliens differentiated solely by
whether they happened to have been removed from the United States.
One class of aliens-those who successfully challenge their deportation
order while inside the United States-will remain subject to the Act's
deportability standards for any further proceedings, while a second class
of aliens-those who successfully challenge their deportation order after
having been removed-will be subject to the Act's inadmissibility stan-
dards in any further proceedings.
It would be a difficult chore for the government to articulate a legiti-
mate basis for distinguishing these two classes of aliens. This distinction's
arbitrary nature can be seen in several ways. First, deportation is the only
fact that differentiates these two classes. But the issue of whether to ap-
ply deportability or inadmissibility standards only arises when the order
that led to the alien's deportation is vacated. While there may be valid
reasons for distinguishing between deported and non-deported aliens
when a deportation order remains in force, 203 it is hard to see a rational
basis for distinguishing between deported and non-deported aliens when
the deportation turns out to have been erroneous.
Second, various factors that are unrelated to the merits of the alien's
case may affect whether an alien is actually deported following a final
deportation order. As Professor Rachel Rosenbloom has identified,
"[a]ny number of circumstances might keep a person from physically
leaving the United States following the entry of a final removal order:
statelessness, lack of a repatriation agreement with the country desig-
201. See, e.g., Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 626 (1986) ("It is an axiom of
administrative law that an agency's explanation of the basis for its decision must include 'a
rational connection between the facts found and the choice made."' (quoting Motor Vehi-
cle Mfrs. Ass'n. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983))).
202. See id. at 626-27 ("Agency deference has not come so far that we will uphold
regulations whenever it is possible to conceive a basis for administrative action. To the
contrary, the presumption of regularity afforded an agency in fulfilling its statutory man-
date is not equivalent to the minimum rationality a statute must bear in order to withstand
analysis under the Due Process Clause.") (internal quotation marks omitted)).
203. See, e.g., Avila-Sanchez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting
equal protection challenge to a regulation that barred illegally reentering aliens from seek-
ing a special form of relief, finding that "[t]he government has a legitimate interest in
discouraging aliens who have already been deported from illegally reentering") (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted).
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nated for removal, the granting of a stay, or even simply the govern-
ment's failure to act."'20 4 Thus, aliens who cannot be repatriated may end
up remaining in the United States while their petitions for review are
ongoing, while aliens who can be repatriated will end up pursuing their
petitions from abroad. It is hard to envision the justification for applying
one substantive standard to the former category but a different substan-
tive standard to the latter.
Third, applying inadmissibility standards to aliens who prevail from
abroad distinguishes between those aliens who win their appeal at the
BIA level and those who win at the circuit court level. Because aliens
receive an automatic stay of removal during an appeal to the BIA,20 5 any
alien who receives a favorable decision from the BIA will remain subject
to deportability standards once the case is remanded to the immigration
judge, while an alien who prevails at the circuit court level (and who did
not receive a discretionary stay) will be subject to inadmissibility stan-
dards. One could argue that a rational basis exists for such a distinction
because aliens who file petitions for review have already gone through
one round of appellate review and the BIA has denied their appeal (or
sustained the government's appeal). However, the high reversal rate of
BIA decisions and the federal appellate bench's loud criticisms of the
often shoddy decision-making of immigration judges and the BIA under-
cut the force of that distinction.20 6
Finally, this practice arbitrarily discriminates between aliens who ob-
tain a stay of removal while their petitions for review are pending and
aliens who do not. One could hypothesize that Congress may have
wanted to distinguish between aliens who were able to demonstrate a
high likelihood of success on the merits, thus justifying a stay, and those
aliens who appeared to have a low chance of success and thus did not
receive a stay. The standard for a stay, however, is not whether the alien
will succeed on the merits but whether the alien is likely to succeed on the
merits, and the decision on the stay occurs at an early stage of the appeal
before the parties have had a chance to fully brief the issues on the mer-
its. It would make little sense to say that an alien who in fact did succeed
on the merits should be subjected to more restrictive inadmissibility re-
quirements because the alien did not show at the outset that he or she
was likely to succeed. Moreover, any attempt to provide a hypothetical
rationale for distinguishing between aliens who receive a stay and aliens
who do not runs headlong into Congress's actual rationale for the 1996
amendments, which was to equalize the treatment of aliens inside and
outside the United States by removing the automatic stay and permitting
aliens to pursue their petitions for review from abroad.
While it is quite difficult to show that a classification fails to satisfy
rational basis review, the argument here is not without support. In sev-
204. Rosenbloom, Remedies for the Wrongly Deported, supra note 28, at 180.
205. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(a) (2006).
206. See supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 65
Illegal Emigration
eral other contexts, federal courts have found that applying different sub-
stantive standards to aliens who have not previously left the country than
to those who have left the country lacked any rational basis and violated
equal protection. In Po Shing Yeung v. INS, the Eleventh Circuit found
that no rational basis existed for a rule that allowed aliens in deportation
proceedings to seek a discretionary waiver for a deportable offense if
they had departed and returned to the United States after having com-
mitted the offense at issue but that prohibited aliens from seeking that
waiver if they had never left the United States.20 7 Similarly, in Francis v.
INS, the Second Circuit found no rational basis for a rule that permitted
aliens who committed a removable offense to seek discretionary relief
from removal if they had departed and reentered the United States after
committing their offense, but that prohibited such relief to aliens who
were otherwise eligible but who had not departed the United States.20 8
Although it was not required to do so, the BIA subsequently adopted the
Francis Court's holding as binding throughout the country. 20 9 While
those two cases differ from the distinction created by the government's
practice here, in that they both differentiated between aliens who volun-
tarily took a short trip abroad and those who did not, the logic underlying
both decisions applies equally to aliens who win their petitions for review
from abroad. If anything, the classification between aliens who prevail
after being deported and those who prevail while in the United States has
even less justification since in the latter case, the alien's departure from
the United States is involuntary rather than voluntary and is predicated
on an order of removal that is ultimately determined invalid.
In short, while it may be possible for the government to articulate a
rational basis for distinguishing between aliens who prevail from abroad
and those who prevail from inside the United States, it is difficult to iden-
tify what this basis would be. The lack of any clearly apparent justifica-
tion for such a distinction renders the government's practice of subjecting
aliens who prevail while abroad to inadmissibility standards susceptible to
an equal protection or arbitrary and capricious challenge.
207. 76 F.3d 337, 340 ("To claim, as the INS does here, that Po belongs to a different
classification of persons simply by virtue of his failure to depart and reenter, is to recognize
a distinction that can only be characterized as arbitrary, and that is without a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation." (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).
208. 532 F.2d 268, 269 (2d Cir. 1976). A number of other circuits have followed Francis.
See, e.g., Caroleo v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 158, 163 n.3 (3d Cir. 2007), abrogated on other
grounds by Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011); Gonzalez v. INS, 996 F.2d 804, 806
(6th Cir. 1993); Leal-Rodriguez v. INS, 990 F.2d 939, 949 (7th Cir. 1993); Butros v. INS, 990
F.2d 1142, 1143 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc); Casalena v. INS, 984 F.2d 105, 106 n.3 (4th Cir.
1993); Ghassan v. INS, 972 F.2d 631, 633 n.2 (5th Cir. 1992); Campos v. INS, 961 F.2d 309,
313 (1st Cir. 1992); Vissian v. INS, 548 F.2d 325, 328 n.3 (10th Cir. 1977).




The previous sections have attempted to demonstrate the legal and
practical problems associated with subjecting aliens who successfully
overturn their deportation orders while abroad to more stringent inad-
missibility standards rather than to the deportability standards that were
applied to them during their original deportation proceedings. This sec-
tion proposes what is hopefully a simple and easily implemented solution:
if the government intends to continue pursuing removal actions against
aliens who win their appeals, those actions should be governed by the
same deportability standards that governed the proceedings when the
alien was originally in the United States. Applying a consistent set of
legal standards to an alien, irrespective of whether the alien happens to
be inside or outside the United States, makes deportation proceedings
fair, ensures consistency with IIRIRA's goal of allowing aliens to pursue
their appeals from abroad, and maintains fidelity to the Constitution.
In addition to being doctrinally defensible, a policy of applying de-
portability standards to aliens who prevail from abroad offers several ad-
vantages. First, the policy is easily administered. No new legislation is
required. No new procedures need to be implemented. Rather, any con-
tinuation of the alien's deportation proceeding would be governed by the
same existing standards that governed during the original proceedings. 210
Immigration judges would have the flexibility and authority to apply de-
portability standards rather than inadmissibility standards in any individ-
ual case in which the facts would warrant it.
Second, such a policy promotes general notions of fairness. Fairness
principles support providing a remedy that rectifies the harm caused by
unlawful conduct and returns the victim to the status quo as it existed (or
as close to it as possible) at the time the unlawful conduct occurred. In
order to truly rectify the harm a wrongful removal caused, it is essential
to restore the alien to his or her precise status before removal, which
would be lawful presence in the United States at the time the deportation
proceedings were initiated. In other words, it is not sufficient to merely
restore the alien to his or her prior immigration status-that is, that of a
lawful permanent resident or a valid visa holder. To truly restore the
status quo, the alien must also be treated as someone lawfully inside the
United States pending the outcome of the deportation proceedings. 211
210. There still may be some exceptions to this general rule. For example, Congress
could possibly amend the INA's deportability grounds in the period between when the
alien is deported and when the alien's petition for review is decided. If Congress makes
those amendments retroactive, and if doing so is constitutionally permissible, then in that
case the new deportability standards would apply rather than the original standards. This
is because the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause, which prevents such retroactive appli-
cation in criminal matters, does not apply to immigration proceedings. See, e.g., Marcello
v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 314 (1955).
211. For LPRs, it would appear to be required by statute that restoring an alien to LPR
status also restores the alien's right to reside in the United States. The INA defines a
lawful permanent resident as one who has been accorded "the status of having been law-
fully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant
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While adding that extra requirement may seem semantic, it is of critical
importance. If the alien is simply restored to his or her prior immigration
status without being put back in the position of being lawfully inside the
United States, then the government might have grounds for keeping a
prevailing alien out of the United States even when applying de-
portability standards. This is because the deportability standards make
an individual deportable if the individual was inadmissible at the time of
entering the country. 212
There is no reason why the effect of a federal court decision vacating a
deportation order could not include treating the alien as lawfully inside
the United States even if the alien is physically outside the United States
at the time the ruling is issued. The BIA, however, has suggested that it
might not have the authority to treat a departed alien as lawfully inside
the United States on the ground that "[r]esponsibility for border security
and the inspection and admission of aliens from abroad is delegated to
the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State, but not to this Board. '213
Government attorneys also appear to have taken the position that it may
not be possible to provide a remedy that effectively places the alien inside
the United States.214 It is questionable whether these views are correct.
First, several federal courts have already rejected the BIA's position that
it lacks authority to grant relief to aliens who are no longer inside the
United States.215 Second, it is well-established that both immigration
judges and federal judges have authority to grant nunc pro tunc relief,216
meaning relief that is back-dated to the time of injury.217 Nunc pro tunc
relief allows a court to make its order effective as of the date of the origi-
nal deportation order, a time when the alien was inside the United States
and had not yet been removed. Third, even if the BIA for some reason
in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having changed." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(20) (2006).
212. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
213. In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 1. & N. Dec. 646, 656 (B.I.A. 2008).
214. In one case before the Fifth Circuit, the government asserted that "there is no
remedy that can return [the petitioner] to the status he had prior to his removal, i.e., an
alien seeking to remain in the United States pending adjudication of an application for
adjustment of status in conjunction with a discretionary waiver." See FOIA Complaint,
supra note 28, at Ex. Y (letter from Joseph D. Hardy, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigra-
tion Lit., U.S. Dep't of Justice, 5th Cir.).
215. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 130 n.4 (2d Cir. 2000) (The "far-reaching
equitable remedy of granting relief nunc pro tunc in certain exceptional cases has long
been available under immigration law."); Batanic v. INS, 12 F.3d 662, 667-68 (7th Cir.
1993) (affording petitioner the right to apply for asylum nunc pro tunc); In re Rapacon, 14
I. & N. Dec. 375, 378 (B.I.A. 1973) (application for permission to reapply for admission to
the United States after deportation is granted nunc pro tunc); see also Salgado-Diaz v.
Gonzales, 395 F.3d 1158, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (If petitioner is eligible to show that he
was unlawfully removed from the country, he "will be entitled to the relief available at the
time of his original hearing.").
217. Black's Law Dictionary defines "nunc pro tunc," which is Latin for "now for then,"
to mean "[h]aving retroactive legal effect through a court's inherent power." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (citing 35A C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 370, at 556 (1960)
("When an order is signed 'nunc pro tunc' as of a specified date, it means that a thing is
now done which should have been done on the specified date.")).
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lacks the power to assist an alien who is outside the United States,
IIRIRA makes clear that the federal courts of appeals do retain jurisdic-
tion over departed aliens. Thus, a court of appeals would have authority
to grant relief that places the alien in the position of being lawfully inside
the United States, even if the BIA would not.
Of course, requiring the government to apply deportability standards
to aliens who prevail from abroad is not the only possible solution to the
problem of wrongly deported aliens who fall within the inadmissibility
gap. Another solution would be to bring back the automatic stay of re-
moval during the pendency of the petition for review so that aliens do not
face the risk of having to seek reentry if they win their petitions. Some
scholars and advocates have proposed reinstating the automatic stay of
removal. 218 This solution, however, is less practical. First, it would re-
quire legislative action to amend the INA, and it is not clear that there is
any impetus in Congress to change the INA in this manner any time soon.
Second, it fails to account for those aliens who may prefer to be deported
pending the outcome of their petition rather than to remain imprisoned
in federal detention facilities for up to several years until their petitions
for review are decided.2 19
Another solution would be to harmonize the deportability and inad-
missibility standards so that there is no inadmissibility gap. Again, how-
ever, this would require a substantial legislative overhaul by Congress.
Furthermore, it may be that Congress generally has valid reasons for ap-
plying different standards to those who are seeking to enter the United
States for the first time than to those who have been permitted to enter
the United States and the government now seeks to remove. Thus, while
the solution of requiring the application of deportability standards to
aliens who prevail on their petitions for review from abroad may carry its
own set of complications, it may be preferable, or at least more realistic,
than other possible solutions.
VII. CONCLUSION
Deportation is a serious matter. Policies governing deportation should
be crafted with care to ensure that individuals who may have a right to
remain in the United States do not have their lives irrevocably altered.
Unfortunately, the government's practice of creating an inadmissibility
gap by applying inadmissibility standards to aliens who successfully chal-
lenge deportation orders from abroad does not reflect a level of thought-
fulness commensurate with the significant consequences of deportation.
Instead, it causes substantial unfairness for the many aliens who are
wrongly deported but then find themselves unable to return to the United
States as a result. Consequently, individuals who successfully challenge
deportation decisions should be restored to their prior immigration status
218. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 114, at 1719; Baldini-Potermin, supra note 119.
219. See supra note 132 and accompanying text for an explanation of why some aliens
may opt for deportation over staying in the country.
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as it existed prior to the commencement of deportation proceedings.
They should not be relegated to the lesser status of arriving aliens simply
because they happened to win their challenge after being deported rather
than before being deported. Any other result is inconsistent with the
INA, the U.S. Constitution, and general notions of fundamental fairness.
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